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1.  Introduction
Public finance in less developed countries is the focal point - both as source and destination - of
many of the dilemmas and conflicts posed by development.  Revenue mobilization for the allocative,
distributive and stabilization functions of the state is severely constrained by the narrowness and
instability of the tax base.  The latter, in turn, is the result of political constraints rooted in socio-
economic inequalities, economic constraints arising from the structures of production and trade, and
administrative constraints reflecting a weakly developed state apparatus.  As a consequence, public
infrastructure and human development expenditures, which are among the most effective vehicles
available for reaching the poor and promoting growth at the same time, persistently fall short of socially
desired levels.  While fiscal constraints do not always reflect the need to finance current and capital
outlays for development, public investment is often the first victim of fiscal troubles.  Moreover, states
must typically resort to modes of taxation and budget financing that violate accepted canons of
economic efficiency and `good’ macroeconomic policy.  For much the same reasons - political,
economic and administrative - social transfers through the budget must also rely on inefficient and leaky
buckets.  Hence, from both the expenditure and revenue sides, public squalor exacerbates private
squalor.
Overcoming fiscal constraints is both cause and consequence of a cumulative process of
internal integration.  The intra-national division of labor, as Adam Smith observed, is limited by the
extent of the market: specialization is a public good producing external benefits that are jointly
consumed.  In addition, public infrastructure investment (in transport and communications, education,
research, extending the land frontier, etc.) raises productivity both directly and by extending the home
-2-
market while, the development of state institutions (enactment and enforcement of laws, tax collecting
machinery, maintaining order, etc.) serves to expand the state’s revenues.  As the market expands, the
costs of running the state and delivering infrastructure services fall and state revenues increase at the
same time.  These make possible an increased supply of public goods and services which further
extends the home market.  Hence, the expansion of the home market and modern state formation feed
on each other in cumulative fashion and add to national competitiveness and productivity.  Similarly,
while an initially significant productivity lag seems almost inevitable in agriculture relative to industry and
in informal activities relative to the formal, a successful process of internal integration must dissolve these
lags progressively over time.  Such internal convergence and integration is both the hallmark and the
principal mechanism of development.  It is also the basis for raising national competitiveness and
achieving international convergence.
Consistent with this formulation, states have played a pivotal role in capitalist transformations
throughout the world.  The development of the market system has required the simultaneous
development of institutions, including the state itself, to support it.  Late developers have found it
necessary to fashion state institutions and policies that are more actively engaged, both qualitatively and
quantitatively, in the development process.  Nurturing local development against competing global forces
has become a progressively more delicate affair.  Strategic direction of the economy, macroeconomic
management to secure internal and external balance, and selective engagement in global markets to
exploit its opportunities and thwart its constraints have been added to the more traditional tasks of
establishing new forms of property relations and associated legal and enforcement systems, ensuring
order, supplying infrastructural and educational services and, above all, resolving the fundamental
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political conflicts arising in the process of constructing a market system.
But internal integration is not a mechanistic process that is guaranteed to succeed.  It requires
coordinated structural change and investments, and hence a major role for public policy and public
finance.  This is the reason for ensuring that the conditions in which national economies are integrated
with global markets do not jeopardize national autonomy.  Globalization or external integration of
weakly integrated national economies forces unpleasant tradeoffs between the requirements of internal
integration and those of external integration.  In a globalizing world, the problem for developing
countries is not so much that external integration threatens internal disintegration.  Rather, external
integration may abort a healthy process of internal integration that is practically a defining element in
successful development.  At the very least, management of these tradeoffs requires a modicum of
national autonomy which can only be sustained with a measure of fiscal autonomy from the pressures of
globalization.
At the same time, a half century of experience shows that it does not follow, merely from
demonstrating the developmental value of national autonomy, that the state will exercise its autonomy
successfully.  Modern state formation has been no less problematic than the process of economic
modernization or development, as the history of western Europe reveals.  Constraints originate both
from conflicts in civil society and from failures within the state.  In many parts of the developing world,
the four or five decades following the retreat of colonialism have seen intense state-building activity and
attempted modernization.  The complementarity between these processes noted above does not imply
that they will be successfully implemented.  The failures and reversals (as also the successes) in this
effort cannot be understood except in political terms i.e., in terms of the conflicts generated by the
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social embeddedness of both state and economy.
Yet, economic and ideological compulsions arising from the very lack of economic success has
strengthened a rather optimistic vision of development through globalization.  Liberalized markets, in
this view, are the optimal route to both internal and external integration.  This view is based on both
economic and political arguments.  On the economic side, this is illustrated by the gains from
international trade. The main instruments include trade policy reform (dismantling quantitative
restrictions, reducing tariff rates and ensuring currency convertibility), openness to capital and
technology flows, unhindered flow of domestic investment and labor across sectors (flexibility and free
exit), financial reform to permit market-determination of investment and saving, and public sector
disinvestment.  On the political side, it is argued that the global market provides the ideal antidote to
political cupidity and stupidity since states, when not bound to a minimalist agenda by the global market
system, are liable to be captured by sheltered special interests or fall victim to erroneous ideas.  Hence,
globalization is not merely useful for extending the gains from trade; it is in fact the most effective
means available to achieve the minimalist state, thus also avoiding the much larger losses from “rent-
seeking”.  Clearly, the most important implication of this policy agenda is that internal and external
integration are strictly complementary.
In keeping with this orthodox formulation, the fiscal effects of liberalization have received far less
attention in the literature than their `real’ effects on exports, resource allocation across sectors, and on
the trade or external balance.  By contrast, this paper focusses on the fiscal impact of globalization on
the theory that government budgets have been a principal site at which the tradeoffs between internal
and external integration make themselves felt.  Using cross-country evidence for the period 1970-96,
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the paper explores the revenue and expenditure implications of trade and financial liberalization.  Such
liberalization has been effected, particularly in the 1980s and 1990s, not only through the structural
adjustment packages and conditionalities of international lending institutions but also by reform efforts
undertaken by countries fearful of losing access to global markets and capital flows.
The plan of the paper is as follows.  Section 2 provides an overview of trends in economic
openness and in fiscal aggregates.  It also suggests a theoretical basis for understanding the emergence
of fiscal constraints in less developed countries (LDCs) from the viewpoint of both economic growth
and human development.  Section 3 analyzes trends in the tax structure of LDCs during the period of
liberalizing reforms.  Apart from a comparison in tax structures across levels of development, the main
object of the analysis is the decline in government revenues from trade following tariff and export tax
rate reductions.  Decomposition of revenue effects shows that trade failed to rise sufficiently to
compensate for the rate reductions in most countries.  Section 4 looks at the fiscal effects of rising
national debts and financial liberalization particularly in low-income countries.  A crude aggregate index
of the fiscal impact flowing from liberalization -  in the form of trade revenue losses and rising public
debt-servicing burdens - suggests that globalization has indeed produced a fiscal squeeze for LDC
governments.  Section 5 looks at the effects of the fiscal squeeze on government investments in public
capital and human capital.  International experience in this respect seems varied reflecting perhaps the
diverse policy responses to the fiscal squeeze and the initial conditions faced.  Nevertheless, the cross-
national evidence shows that the fiscal squeeze has dampened overall (physical and human capital)
investment in developing countries.  The section ends with a consideration of the redistributive effects of
globalization and their implications for maintaining or strengthening feasible social safety nets.  Section 6
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concludes the paper.
2.  The Fiscal Constraint Under Economic Liberalization
For any given configuration of political and social forces, policy maneuverability in LDCs is
severely restricted by the feasible instruments of policy.  Hence, policy tradeoffs are sharper and policy-
makers must worry not only about the `direct’ effects of policy changes on social groups but also the
gap between the resource demands needed to engineer compromises and the fiscal resources available.
 Put differently, fiscal actions or policies must seek not merely to close social-political gaps but also
ensure that fiscal gaps are not widened in the process.  When countries are more or less chronically
confronted with a fiscal gap, policy change has to be particularly sensitive in this regard.  In particular,
changes that promise overall social gain may nonetheless provide no room for fiscally-mediated
compensation policies or may even reduce the room available.  Such countries may properly be said to
lack fiscal autonomy.
In standard neoclassical economics, the allocation of resources between the public and private
sectors (hence the choice of both tax and expenditure policies) is seen to derive from an optimizing
calculus.  Such a calculus is unproblematic if it is assumed that there exists a well-defined social welfare
function and that needed resource transfers between the public and private sectors (or within the private
economy) can be arranged through non-distortionary lump-sum transfers.  These assumptions ensure
that a social contract is costlessly defined and costlessly implemented.  Fiscal autonomy here is absolute
and the budget is a first-best outcome.
A dose of realism may be added to this formulation with the recognition that real-world taxes to
finance the budget are bound to distort resource allocation and that there will also be costs in reaching a
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social contract.  In other words, resource allocation between the public and private sectors entails
tradeoffs that go beyond the purely technologically-defined opportunity costs.  These additional
tradeoffs arise essentially from incentive effects, the transactions costs of political bargaining, and the
costs of administration to effect needed taxes and transfers.  If it is assumed that these added tradeoffs
in the budget are essentially calculable, even if only through a social-political bargaining process, then,
the budget will be a second-best outcome. 
From such a viewpoint, therefore, the fiscal autonomy of the state, even allowing for economic
feedbacks, can never be compromised.  At worst, fiscal autonomy may be monopolized by a narrow
interest group or by a runaway state not answerable to civil society, a particular outcome of the `social
contract’ rather than the absence of a contract.  There can be no room, in this conception, for economic
forces to directly constrain fiscal maneuverability.  Even openness to liberalized markets and
globalization that narrowly limit state options is seen as a policy choice.
In practice, LDC governments confront financing constraints of greater or less severity in
pursuing otherwise feasible growth-enhancing or human development-enhancing policies.  While these
may be formally seen, as above, to flow from the prevailing political-economic equilibrium, the very
existence of fiscal constraints suggests that there are multiple equilibria.  The economy may get stuck in a
bad equilibrium when political and economic factors reinforce each other.  Suppose, for example, that
equilibrium A produces a more equitable, human development-enhancing outcome compared to
equilibrium B.  Assume also that A requires a larger budget than B but that political-economic factors,
by constraining the budget, make B the prevailing, self-enforcing equilibrium.  If new economic policy
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choices serve to relax the fiscal constraint, the economy may then be able to move to equilibrium A1.
                                                
1  To be sure, moving out of the fiscally-constrained initial equilibrium cannot be a matter only of
the right policy choice being technically feasible.  But an `outside’ observer or policy analyst ought to
take into account how, in economic terms, policy recommendations relax or reinforce the constraint,
and how, in political terms, they enlarge or constrict the room for left-out groups in society to participate
in the process that determines budgets and to make their valuations relevant.
A fiscal constraint arises in developing countries chiefly from the facts that the tax base is usually
narrow and there are strict limits to how far tax rates can be raised on that narrow base when
adjustment involves the whole economy.  LDCs tend to have a relatively large share of economic
activity in low-taxed sectors such as agriculture, informal industry and services; in addition, a significant
part of the potential revenue at legislated rates fails to be realized on account of collection problems,
corruption and evasion.  The problem also has a dynamic dimension.  As an economy grows, its fiscal
requirements are also expected to grow.  This association has causal factors going both ways.  A larger
economy is easier to tax but a larger economy also require larger fiscal outlays.  This does not
necessarily mean that economic growth and government budget outlays can grow in a smooth and
balanced fashion.  There are important lags in the redesigning of the fiscal structure since political and
administrative obstacles must be overcome.  Conversely, there may also be important leads from fiscal
effort to economic growth i.e., growth itself may depend on a rise in fiscal outlays.  Such dynamic fiscal
lags and leads can conspire to hold back growth itself.
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Apart from limits on taxation, other ways of financing government deficits also quickly run into
diminishing political and economic returns.  Foreign financing, which mostly takes the form of grants and
loans to governments, cannot be directly controlled by the borrowing government.  They also come with
conditionalities that may narrow policy choices and fiscal autonomy.  Similarly, domestic finance is
limited by the underdeveloped state of domestic financial markets on the one hand and the inflationary
potential of bank financing on the other.
Following the world-wide slowdown in growth and rise in interest rates, many developing
countries emerged from the 1980s with the need to make massive external transfers on account of
accumulated debt.  At the same time, a large internal transfer had to be effected since much of this debt
was incurred on public account whilst export earnings that would pay for it was mostly private.  Apart
from the narrow fiscal choices available to effect this internal transfer, the adjustment process itself
tended to be contractionary with attendant losses rather than gains in public revenue.  As a
consequence, fiscal retrenchment became the order of the day in most countries undergoing adjustment.
 Reductions in the non-interest part of expenditure tended to hurt public capital expenditure with further
growth-reducing effects.
Conditionalities accompanying accommodation by creditors included a general program of
market liberalization.  Thus, many developing economies have engaged in external liberalization while
faced with balance-of-payments and fiscal constraints.  In particular, trade liberalization - which has
almost invariably reduced public revenues - has had to be undertaken alongside public expenditure
reductions and/or non-trade-based tax increases.  Moreover, devaluations undertaken as part of the
reform package have raised government debt service obligations.  Trade and exchange reforms thus
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added a further important fiscal burden leading to cuts in domestic capital accumulation.  It is in this
sense that adjustment to debt and adjustment to liberalization have had major fiscal, growth and
redistributive effects.  As persistent fiscal deficits added to the public debt, financial liberalization and
increased reliance on foreign financing of public deficits did not help since interest rates on market
borrowing by states rose to add to the burden.
The quality of fiscal adjustment is a matter of sustaining, indeed raising, the levels of public
capital investment on the one hand and of widening the tax net on the other.  Liberalization tends to
militate against both objectives in the short to medium term.  When this is coupled with the argument
above that the policy regime reinforces politics and vice versa, liberalization aimed at globalization may
also produce adverse longer-term impacts.  While it might be supposed that once the transition is
weathered, growth cannot decline and possibly rise, the fiscal constraint has remained at the center of
the dilemma of how to effect the transition without hurting growth prospects.
For these reasons,  the analysis of fiscal trends that follows must be placed in the context of
growing globalization.  Table 1 summarizes the broad picture of economic globalization in terms of
exports plus imports relative to GDP; the taxation of trade whether for protective or fiscal
purposes; and the flow of net foreign direct investment (FDI).  Trade openness may be measured
directly in terms of the trade share in GDP and also in terms of a Trade Index which is constructed
from the trade share after controlling for the facts that richer countries are more open and so are
smaller countries (Rao, 1998).  Trade taxation is indicated both ex ante i.e. based on weighted
average published tariff rates circa 1992, and as ex post realized tax rates i.e. total trade tax
revenues divided by total trade (hereafter the “trade tax ratio”).  The trade ratio and the Trade
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Index are highly correlated, and so are the ex ante import tariff and ex post trade tax ratio2.  The
correlation between the trade/GDP and the FDI/GDP ratios is also statistically significant though
less pronounced.  Nevertheless, openness and globalization are not the same thing.  The latter
refers to outcomes in terms of cross-border transactions; the former to policy inputs, whether at the
border or not, that may affect globalization.
The main conclusions from Table 1 may be summarized as follows.  (1) Low-income
countries as well as other groups have shared in the global growth of trade relative to national
incomes of the past quarter century even though this period has seen a continuing divergence in
economic growth performance; however, trade growth has not been uniform across all groups
reflecting the uneven spread of the benefits of globalization and, not any less, its costs.  (2) Taxes on
trade have declined everywhere but the relative decline is itself inversely related to income levels
(trade taxes have fallen most in the high-income and least in low-income countries); in
consequence, the worldwide dispersal of trade taxation has increased substantially3.  (3) Countries
                                                
2  The correlation coefficients are respectively 0.69 ad 0.73 over the sample of 123 countries
for 1970-96.
3  This is subject to the qualification that the influence of non-tariff barriers is not captured
by trade tax measures nor even entirely by measured trade outcomes.  The trade tax ratio is
obviously a more accurate measure of the fiscal aspect of trade taxation than of the protective
aspect of trade policies.
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that had higher trade ratios and Trade Indices also tended to have higher net FDI inflows; trade
openness and investment openness and/or attractiveness seem to go together; notably also, whereas
low-income countries were at the low-end in terms of FDI inflows during the 1980s, the 1990s have
witnessed a correction4.
                                                
4  This is not to say that capital necessarily flows from the best-endowed regions nor that it
flows to the worst-endowed, much less that the flows are in (inverse) proportion to existing
endowments.
Table 2 reveals trends in the main fiscal aggregates.  Tax revenues as a proportion of GDP
clearly rise with per capita income.  In the high-income countries, this proportion is, on average,
more than double that in low-income countries.  Non-tax revenues are also substantially higher
(5.4%) in the upper middle-income countries than in the low-income countries (2.6%).  Low-
income countries have clearly lost tax revenue relative to GDP during the 1980s and 1990s (the fall
represents 14% of the tax/GDP ratio i.e., from 15.3% in 1981-85 to 13.1% in 1991-96).  Upper
middle-income countries also lost revenue to the tune of 11% in the tax/GDP ratio.  By contrast
lower middle-income countries lost but little between the two halves of the 1980s and then more
than made up the loss to end with a higher average tax/GDP ratio during the 1990s than before. 
The high-income group never saw any decline in their tax/GDP ratio throughout the quarter
century till 1996.  Even between the 1980s and 1990s, their tax effort rose by 5%.
What accounts for these trends in the tax/GDP ratio?  The following regression estimates
the relationship between the tax/GDP ratio and per capita income after controlling for size, trade
taxation and the trade ratio.
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TAXREV/Y  = - 23.62 + 3.28Ln(pcY) + 0.54Ln(Pop.) + 0.32(TradTax/Tr.) + 0.12(Trade/Y) (1)
   (7.77)    (0.49)       (0.35)        (0.10)      (0.02)
   (0.00)    (0.00)       (0.13)        (0.00)      (0.00)
(with R2=0.42 and N=217)5.
Per capita income raises the tax/GDP ratio from both supply and demand sides.  On the supply
side, income growth and the accompanying structural change increases the taxable part of national
income.  On the demand side, income growth requires greater public investment in physical and
financial infrastructure and/or increases the demand for government social services (especially
social transfer programs)6.
                                                
5  Observations are means of annual values for the following three periods 1970-79, 1980-
87 and 1988-96.  Here as elsewhere in this paper, the first row of figures in parentheses are standard
errors and those in the second row in parentheses indicate the level of significance.
6  It is noteworthy, however, that the proportion of non-tax revenues relative to total revenue
is a decreasing function of per capita income.  This may be accounted for by the greater
involvement of LDC governments in production activities, services provision (from which some
user charges are collected), monopoly trading, and the like.
If the above structural relationship indeed holds, then, it stands to reason that attempting to
change the structure of taxation in the direction of developed country norms - the thrust of trade
liberalization - particularly in a period of stagnant or falling per capita incomes cannot be achieved
easily.  Alternatively, such a movement may well be accompanied by increased fiscal deficits,
higher foreign financing and/or reduced expenditures.  For the low-income group, equation (1)
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predicts a drop of 0.2% points in the tax/GDP ratio from the first half of the 1980s to the 1990s on
account of the 8% fall in real GDP per capita and another 0.25% points on account of the drop in
the trade taxes ratio relative to trade.  This drop is matched, however, by the predicted rise in the
tax ratio on account of the rise in the trade ratio during this period.  Yet, the overall tax ratio has
fallen as noted above. This suggests that revenue losses have occurred on account of significant
policy and/or structural shifts that accompanied the reforms package implemented in these
economies.
Total government expenditure fell steeply in all the three LDC groups between the early
1980s and the 1990s but it rose somewhat in the high-income group of countries.  For the low-
income group, total expenditure relative to GDP fell 2 percentage points, the same as the fall in
current (tax and non-tax) revenues.  Total expenditure fell in the lower middle-income countries by
2.3 percentage points despite the stability of government revenues while the fall in expenditure in
the upper middle-income group equaled two-thirds of the fall in government revenues.  Thus, fiscal
adjustment to the decline in revenues has involved varying degrees of reduction in government
expenditure.
Table 2 shows that fiscal deficits averaged highest (5.2%) in the low-income countries
during the 1990s.  Deficits averaged 3.3% and 3.2% respectively in the upper middle-income and
high-income countries.  The lower middle-income countries had the lowest average fiscal deficit
ratio of all the groups at just 0.7%.  These comparisons should be viewed against the fact that
aggregate fiscal expenditure and the overall fiscal take is considerably higher in the higher-income
groups than in low-income countries.
All country groupings witnessed significant fiscal adjustment between the 1980s and 1990s
in the form of falling average deficit ratios.  But the low-income countries seem to have had the
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most difficulty in making the adjustment.  The relative reduction in the fiscal deficit between the
first half of the 1980s and the 1990s averaged as much as 82% for the lower middle-income
countries, 33 % for the upper middle-income group, 40% for the high-income group and only 21%
for the low-income nations.  Many developing countries were under IMF lending programs during
the late 1980s and 1990s.  Domestic financing of fiscal deficits has fallen while foreign financing has
risen in low-income and lower middle-income countries during the 1990s.
Equation (1) suggests that the partial effect of greater globalization or openness (as measured by
the trade ratio) is to raise the tax/GDP ratio.  But the causal mechanisms involved cannot be presumed
to be the same in developed and less developed countries.  In less developed countries, with relatively
high rates of trade taxation in place, a higher trade ratio increases the ability of the government to garner
revenues from trade. This effect is reinforced by the fact that revenues from domestic indirect taxation
are also more easily collected from trade than from many domestic sectors.  Clearly, therefore, while
trade increases tax revenues in LDCs, trade taxation is a requirement for this favorable linkage
even though trade taxes themselves hurt trade7.  The policy implication is equally clear.  While
fostering trade is one route to raising revenues, reducing trade taxation typically fails to accomplish
this (see the next section), and a policy of free trade implying zero taxation of trade certainly will
not.  On the other hand, domestic policies and investments designed to raise the trade ratio without
lowering trade taxation will help the fisc.
In developed countries, with rates of trade taxation close to zero, if a trade-fisc association
holds, it cannot be due to a revenue-side effect.  It has been argued that the world-wide link between
                                                
7  For the cross-country sample here, the simple correlation between the trade/GDP ratio and
the trade tax ratio was 0.21 and statistically significant.
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openness and the size of government reflects the greater expenditure-side demand for public services,
especially social safety nets and transfers (Rodrik, 1998).  The argument above suggests, instead, a
possible contrast across the world: trade and trade taxation augment the budget from the revenue side
in LDCs whereas trade may increase the budget from the expenditure side in developed countries.
To examine whether this contrast holds, separate regressions were run for the developed and
developing countries in the sample with government current expenditure as the dependent variable and
with per capita income, population, the trade/GDP ratio and the trade-tax ratio as the independent
variables.  The regression for the developed country sample is:
CUREXP/Y = 102.8 - 1.4Ln(pcY) - 3.0Ln(Pop.) - .006(Trade/Y) - 3.1(TradTax/Tr.) (2)
(33.5) (2.46)          (0.96)         (0.03)           (0.85)
           (0.00)   (0.57)           (0.00)         (0.02)           (0.00)
(with R2=0.31 and N=73)
while for the LDC sample, the regression is
CUREXP/Y =   -18.2 + 3.53Ln(pcY) + 0.35Ln(Pop.) + 0.11(Trade/Y) + .24(TradTax/Tr.) (3)
      (10.5)  (0.67)      (0.48)         (0.02)             (0.14)
      (0.09)  (0.00)             (0.47)         (0.00)             (0.09)
(with R2=0.28 and N=205).
These results are broadly consistent with the contrast drawn above.  Equation (3) shows that
government expenditure in LDCs rises with the trade ratio as well as with trade taxation.  By contrast,
equation (2) shows that globalization and trade taxation both have negative effects on the size of public
expenditure though the size of the effects is notably small.  The fact that current expenditure levels
actually fall with openness in developed countries throws into question the notion that openness raises
the demand for social transfers.  On the other hand, the positive link between globalization and public
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expenditure in LDCs may be understood as flowing from the supply- or revenue-side effect of trade
taxation which serves to relieve the fiscal constraint that was described at the beginning of this section.
Apart from the structural constraints on revenue mobilization, tax revenues are also substantially
more unstable in LDCs than in industrialized economies.  This difference reflects the greater reliance on
trade taxes which are affected by the boom-bust cycles in commodity prices and realized export
revenues.  Instabilities in the tax/GDP ratio are markedly greater in Africa than in any other region
of the world (Zee, 1996).  Moreover, in terms of instability, the largest (unfavorable) difference
between LDCs and the OECD countries pertains to trade tax revenues (relative to GDP) (Zee,
1996, p. 1663).  Fluctuations in export revenues affect both aggregate income and import demand both
from the demand side and from foreign exchange constraints.  In turn, revenues from import taxation
also suffer fluctuations (Chu, 1990).  Chu finds that the impact of a revenue shock in LDCs was partly
met by a change in government expenditure in the same direction whereas, by contrast, revenue shocks
in industrial countries lead to deficit increases that are larger than the revenue shortfalls.  The difference
is clearly traceable to the lack of “diverse policy instruments’ (p 124, Chu) that underlies the ubiquitous
public financing constraint in developing economies.  The large variability in revenues means that even
if a government is willing to extend its planning horizon to the medium and long terms, its ability to
sustain plans is strongly limited by this form of the fiscal constraint.
3.  Tax Structure, Globalization and Revenue Effects
Structural adjustment and policy changes oriented towards increased external integration of
developing economies have entailed a significant transformation in the tax structure.  This transformation
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arises not only because fiscal policies are among the main instruments for such reorientation but also
because the resultant change in economic structure reacts upon the structure of public revenues.  In the
normal course of economic development, the fiscal structure undergoes a patterned transition reflecting
the transformation in the economic structure that accompanies development.  This section begins with
evidence on these structural differences across countries at different stages of development.  It then
considers the results of globalizing policy changes of the past decade and half  before focusing on
changes brought on by trade liberalization in particular.
Table 3 brings out the salient differences across countries and over time in the structure of
taxation.  Most obviously, the weight of direct taxation rises with per capita income levels.  This
becomes clearer still when we include social security taxes under the “direct taxes” rubric8: the
share of direct taxes rises from just 26.7% in the low-income countries to 39.80% in the lower
middle-income, 47.2% in the upper middle-income and  60.5% in the high-income countries.  But
it is also noteworthy that the share of direct taxes fell in both low-income and high-income countries
by about 10%.  It rose somewhat in the lower middle-income and significantly in the upper middle-
income countries.  Barring this last group, the overall trend augurs poorly for redistributive
policies aimed at advancing human development.  All three LDC groups also witnessed declines in
social security tax collections, a similarly unpleasant development.
Less developed countries are more reliant on corporate than personal income taxes as
compared to developed countries.  The ratio between these two elements was around 1:3 for the
OECD countries while for non-OECD countries, the ratio was about 2:3 (Zee, 1996).  At first
                                                
8  This is justified because social security contributions have employment incomes and profits as
their base.
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glance, this seems very surprising since corporate organization and corporate profits are
undoubtedly a much smaller share of national income in LDCs than in developed countries.  The
observed inversion of shares may be attributed directly to the problems of tax administration. 
Thus, the very difficulty of collecting the personal tax levy in less developed countries raises their
reliance on corporate taxation.
The other major development of course relates to trade tax revenue collections.  Trade
taxation remains far more important to the developing, especially low-income, countries than for
the high-income nations.  Although its share has fallen everywhere - by a fifth in the low-income
group and by two-thirds in the high-income group - the change in fiscal structure this represents is
far more significant in the lower two income groupings.  The weight of this point is especially
evident when we note that the last two decades have been a period of falling or stagnant per capita
incomes in many of these developing countries.  Hence, the move is not just the manifestation of a
structural pattern characteristic of “normal” development.  Rather, it is principally a reflection of
the powerful tendency toward trade liberalization and other forms of policy liberalization.
In developing countries generally, much of the slack created by the decline in trade taxes
has been taken up (in relative, not absolute, terms) by rising domestic indirect taxation.  This is
particularly the case for the low-income countries for which Table 3 suggests a law of invariance:
the sum of domestic taxes and trade taxes on commodities has remained at 70% throughout the 26-
year period.  In many of these countries, the transition within the structure of indirect taxation from
trade toward domestic taxes is also more apparent than real.  Even VAT taxes are collected
disproportionately from tradables (particularly importables) primarily because of the “law” of fiscal
structure i.e., “tax policy is tax administration”.  This follows the observation that fiscal structures
follow definite patterns correlated to income levels that in turn are not explained easily except by
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recourse to administrative impediments and aids in conjunction with the structure of the economy9.
 Hence, too much should not be made of the relative movements in the incidence of indirect
taxation at the border versus within borders that is shown in the last two columns of the Table. 
While domestic indirect taxes as a proportion of the non-service GDP have moved up world-wide,
this represents a real increase in rates in developing countries whereas, for the high-income
countries, it is the falling share of industry in GDP (and growing tax coverage of the rising services
sector) that, in all likelihood, is captured in this movement.
It is noteworthy also that high-income countries whose dependence on trade taxation has
remained minuscule and falling throughout the whole period also experienced a rise in their overall
tax/GDP ratios by contrast to many developing (particularly low-income) countries which suffered
a decline.  In other words, changes in the fiscal structure in the LDCs documented here may be
considered to be “premature” inasmuch as they have entailed revenue losses exacerbating the fiscal
constraint, rather than a “normal” transition.
A final point that emerges from Table 3 of some significance from a policy standpoint is the
observation that export taxation has fallen rather more steeply on average than import taxation. 
Indeed, for the low-income group, import taxes relative to imports have actually risen or remained
stable between the last 3 quinquennia covered.  For the other two LDC groups, however, as steep
as the decline in export taxation has been, import taxation has also fallen especially over the 1990s.
The major shift in the weight of trade taxes noted above calls for closer scrutiny.  Although most
economists view trade taxes only in terms of their effects on resource allocation across various
production activities, particularly protection for import-competing sectors, their fiscal function cannot be
                                                
9  This conclusion is also supported through cluster and principal components analyses of a wide
range of countries and tax structure variables (Hitiris, 1990).
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overemphasized.  As noted earlier, the positive argument for a reliance on trade taxes arises from
administrative or structural imperatives in revenue mobilization.  To the extent this holds, the protective
effects of trade taxation may be incidental rather than fundamental to policy choice.
But even if the protective function is the primary motive of policy, fiscal feasibility may constrain
the choice of policy instruments.  The point may be illustrated in relation to protection of infant industries
against import competition.  The orthodox argument against protective tariffs has always been that they
are inefficient instruments for nurturing infant industries: since the need for intervention must arise from
some market failure, the proper response is to correct or compensate for that failure rather than to
impose tariffs.  Thus, if the failure is in the capital market, a capital subsidy should be extended.  The
fact that most LDCs have pursued import protection instead at least suggests the rationale that the
subsidy option is fiscally costly whilst the tariff option adds to state coffers.  Fiscal factors are among the
most important reasons why LDC governments violate the canons of standard efficiency arguments.
As against the fiscal arguments, the principal advantages claimed for trade liberalization in LDCs
include increased efficiency in resource allocation and faster productivity gains through knowledge
spillovers from trade.  But the size of these effects remains an object of intense controversy especially
when allowance is made for the fact that a budding industrial sector, under protection, generates gains
from increased division of labor and knowledge spillovers of its own.  Moreover, free trade is hardly
necessary for garnering the benefits promised by trade.  It may, on the contrary, even be harmful by
destroying an industrial base without which the benefits of trade-based knowledge and learning
spillovers would be irrelevant.
Even if it be understood that trade liberalization at the margin is socially beneficial, endemic fiscal
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constraints subject actual policy choices in developing countries to the economics of the second-best. 
Inclusive of foregone opportunity costs from fiscal constriction, liberalization may not confer net benefits.
 Nonetheless, there is a further question that these arguments raise.  If governments are dependent on
trade taxes, it would seem natural to suppose that government would want to encourage trade purely
for revenue reasons quite apart from any direct benefits to the economy or indirect gains to the treasury
that trade expansion may bring.  But it is not obvious what the means for doing so are.  European states
in the age of absolutism and mercantilism were inclined to `promote’ trade through the creation of trade
monopolies and colonial conquest which fed their bullion store.  Lacking such options, modern
governments might consider fostering trade by lowering trade taxes.  But this has obvious limits since the
so-called Laffer curve has a positive slope below some level of the tax rate: further reductions in rates
will call forth revenue declines rather than gains10.  Indeed, it can be argued that although trade taxation
reduces trade volumes directly and therefore confronts unpleasant Lafferian tradeoffs from a revenue
standpoint, it may well be an instrument for promoting trade indirectly if the revenues obtained are used
to augment infrastructure and human capital and thereby increase international competitiveness of the
economy.
                                                
10  Lacking precise knowledge of the trade Laffer curve, states are therefore likely to develop a
schizophrenic attitude toward trade.
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The revenue effect of reduced trade liberalization is not easily predicted.  Apart from uncertain
Laffer effects, trade liberalization is in practice part of a package of policy moves including the relaxation
and/or tariffication of quantitative trade restrictions, and real devaluation of the exchange rate.  Consider
the quota regime first.  Unlike tariffs, quotas are not only unambiguously protective but they also do not
- at least directly - contribute to the fisc.  Why governments that are fiscally strapped take recourse to
quotas is therefore an interesting question.  One reason may be that quota rents generated in the
protected sectors are more easily taxed or, where they are publicly owned, accrue to the public sector.
 Another has to do with their effectiveness in protection.  While under certainty, tariffs and quotas have
equal trade incentive effects, uncertain changes in the foreign price will alter the degree of protection
afforded the local industry under a tariff whereas under a quota this is unchanged.  So quotas need not
be inconsistent with a fiscal constraint11.  Quota liberalization, similarly, is certain whilst tariff
liberalization may be neutralized by exchange rate devaluation.  At any rate, the tariffication of quotas (a
common element in recent liberalizations) is indeed revenue-enhancing.  But once quotas have been
tariffized, further liberalization must involve uncertain revenue effects.
Exchange rate policy before and after trade liberalization can make both the protective and
fiscal effects of a particular liberalization package ambiguous.  While a devaluation raises import values
and hence import tax collections, the import tax base also erodes as import prices rise12.  Prior to
                                                
11  Quotas may also be a route to bestowing unearned rents on politically favored or politically
powerful groups.
12  An IMF study of SAF/ESAF countries found that “a currency devaluation usually has a
greater impact on raising current and capital expenditure in local currency than on raising revenue in
local currency terms, which leads to a large increase in the fiscal deficit/GDP ratio” (Nashashibi et al.,
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reforms, the protective effect of prevalent tariffs and quotas may be at least partly nullified by
overvaluation of the exchange rate which reduces the relative price of tradables.  The revenue effect of
the overvaluation will be ambiguous.  Conversely, a real devaluation accompanying trade `liberalization’
can exceed tariff reductions, in which case there will be an increase in the rate of protection.  Again,
revenue effects are ambiguous.
                                                                                                                                                            
1991, p.3, ff 3).
When adjustments are occurring concurrently in competing countries, trade liberalization and
devaluation may also produce terms of trade losses.  Declining terms of trade limit the tax take of
governments since they reduce the tax base of readily taxed sectors.  Moreover, falling commodity
prices create a dilemma for governments that have price stabilization and marketing boards.  They must
choose between letting the fall pass through to producers which might erode the tax base and stabilizing
producer prices which would reduce the tax or raise the subsidy implicit in such arrangements.
Table 4 and Table 4A report the results of an exercise to decompose changes in trade tax
revenues (relative to GDP) into changes in the realized rate of trade taxation (trade taxes relative to
trade) and changes in the tax base (trade relative to GDP).  The analysis is based on mean values of
the variables for developing countries for three periods viz. 1970-79, 1980-87 and 1988-96
(respectively periods 1, 2 and 3).  Changes in the mean values were converted into annualized
average rates.  The individual country results appear in Table 4A while Table 4 shows the averages
of the country results for 4 country groupings viz. low-income sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), other low-
income, lower middle-income and upper middle-income.  The decompositions naturally
incorporate the net effects of all policy changes that countries may have undergone including
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changes in published tax rates, changes in quota regimes, exchange rate changes.  They also
include terms of trade and other exogenous changes.  Note also that both export and import taxes
are included in the results.
The decomposition is employed here to see whether and how far trade growth compensates
for reduced protection accompanying globalization and increased economic openness.  Between
periods 1 and 2, 31 of the 50 countries represented in the sample had declining average trade tax
rates while between periods 2 and 3, 41 of 58 countries saw a decline, and the average rate of
decline in trade taxes was 1.8% and 2.6% per year respectively.  In terms both of the proportion of
countries and the rate of change in trade taxation, therefore, there was a clear and cumulatively
large trend of effective trade liberalization.
Table 4 shows that all LDC groups experienced revenue declines in period 3 which
includes the 1990s.  While low-income SSA and non-SSA countries saw their trade tax revenues
rise in period 2 (i.e., going from period 1 to period 2), the trade tax rate was virtually unchanged in
the case of the former while it rose significantly in the case of the latter.  Thus, no country group in
either period experienced a favorable “Laffer effect” i.e., rising revenues from falling trade taxes
(with the possible exception of low-income SSA in period 2).  These results underline the
complementary rather than competitive nature of imports and exports relative to domestic
production in developing economies.
Table 4A shows that 5 out of the 50 countries in period 2 and 15 of the 58 in period 3
experienced favorable Laffer effects (whether from raising or reducing trade taxation).  The
revenue gainers in period 3 which also reduced tax rates were Ghana, India, Nicaragua, Fiji,
Thailand, Jordan, Paraguay, Poland, Chile and Mexico.  In the case of low-income sub-Saharan
Africa, while Ghana, Zambia and Zimbabwe were the only countries that saw rising trade tax
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revenues in period 3, Ghana was alone in realizing this gain from reduced trade tax rates.  In
period 2, trade tax revenues increased in Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Niger, Zambia and Zimbabwe,
and all of them saw increased realized trade tax rates.  Hence, low-income countries in general, and
SSA in particular, have been especially hard-hit by the adverse fiscal impact of trade liberalization. 
Most of these economies have operated on the rising part of the realized Laffer curve, and therefore
confront a tradeoff between reduced protection and reduced revenues from liberal reforms.
In addition to the factors already noted, changes in the structure of the economy following trade
liberalization also underlie its overall fiscal impact.  That is, the fiscal impact of trade liberalization is not
confined to trade taxation alone but may also be felt in domestic tax collections.  Two such structural
changes are the expected shift in resources from import-competing to export sectors and, from capital-
intensive to labor-intensive sectors.  If the latter of these pairs are low-taxed sectors, then, liberalization
will impose additional revenue losses.  There are two reasons to expect this to be the case.  First,
sectors such as agriculture and small-scale export production typically escape the domestic tax net
because they are legally exempt or effectively untaxed.  Second, large-scale enterprises that are more
easily taxed tend to be concentrated in the capital-intensive and import-competing sectors.  In addition,
cost pressures following trade liberalization prompt larger enterprises to sub-contract production to the
small-scale and informal sectors.  While these shifts may provide employment gains, there may also be
revenue losses.  These secondary revenue losses are likely to outweigh any revenue gains from
increased allocative efficiency that orthodox theory associates with trade liberalization.
Import tariff reductions do not usually provide any concomitant reduction in government outlays.
 The chief reason is that government expenditures tend to be heavily concentrated on non-tradable
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goods and especially services.  A secondary reason is that governments, as consumers, often do not
pay import tariffs (defense is an example). On the other hand, transfer expenditures can be expected to
rise in the wake of trade liberalization. Transition subsidies may have to be raised in sectors hit by
import competition; retrenchment and retraining of workers organized enough to make their demands
felt will add to the fiscal burden; rising food and other relative prices may have to be made good through
compensatory wage increases for government employees, and through food and other subsidies to
politically sensitive consumer groups.
Clearly, both the argument and the evidence underscore the fiscal squeeze, from both revenue
and expenditure sides, that trade liberalization poses13.  One response might be that trade taxation
should be resorted to at best for protection and not for revenue reasons.  Such an argument might be
made on second-best grounds on the trade side and on first-best grounds on the fiscal side.  Apart from
the presumed optimality of the resulting policy regime, its feasibility may be secured by switching from a
reliance on trade taxes to trade-neutral excise taxation or value-added taxes.  Howsoever attractive this
proposal may seem, its feasibility is largely a function of a country’s level of development.  A number of
countries have introduced value added taxes (VATs) within the past decade or modified their VATs in
seeking alternative revenue sources.  However, the revenue results have often been mixed.  Countries
that had the lowest initial levels of tax revenue relative to GDP also fared the worst in terms of
successfully introducing the VAT or other reforms in fiscal structure as well as in generating additional
revenues.  This holds the important lesson that “programs designed to raise revenue over time in low-
                                                
13  The fiscal impact of trade liberalization documented in this paper illustrates the “double
jeopardy” to public finance that globalization threatens (Grunberg, 1998).
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income countries should take account of administrative constraints” (Abed et al., 1998, p.4).  Efficient
and effective revenue mobilization may be more important in these countries than aiming for fiscal
reforms toward a textbook ideal of minimizing allocative inefficiency.  In many countries, moreover,
even the VAT is not `trade-neutral’ in the sense that a greater part of the tradable sectors is subject to
the VAT than of domestic non-tradables so that the efficiency rationale for the shift is blunted.
Another policy argument is that the fiscal squeeze is only a short-run or transitional problem that
will remedy itself once the economy settles into a new steady state with liberalized trade.  However, the
promise of income gains in the long run must be viewed with caution if major distortions remain in the
rest of the economy14.  With widespread infrastructure and human capital constraints typical of poor
countries, constraints that are closely related to the fiscal constraint, the long run gains (if they do exist)
may prove unrealizable since the transition entails a worsening fisc and this could lock the economy into
a bad but politically self-sustaining equilibrium. In the presence of  such distortions, a liberalization may
even end up reducing income and welfare.
Under the circumstances, the success of trade “liberalization” is to be judged not by how close
to free trade a country gets but rather by how well it mediates between the endemic fiscal and foreign
exchange constraints of developing countries.  At the margin, a relaxation of the exchange constraint
would give a potentially strong boost to investment provided that the means by which the relaxation is
effected do not worsen government finances.  The qualification is necessary because a relaxation of the
fiscal constraint too would provide an investment spur. Trade liberalization can be useful in this sense
                                                
14  Following the theorem of the second best, given major distortions elsewhere in the economy,
a liberalization may end up reducing income and welfare.
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but, for the reasons and evidence given above, only within fairly narrow limits.  Beyond this, no
persistent net growth contribution should be expected for such a potential remains in the realm of
speculation.
4.  Financial Liberalization and the Fiscal Squeeze
Apart from trade liberalization, liberalization of the external account and of the domestic financial
system have been at the core of attempts at globalization.  The liberal presumption has been that barriers
to financial mobility across borders are essentially policy-induced and that these are costly.  A relatively
closed financial system has or entails controls on interest rates, exchange rates and the capital account,
and the regulation of credit allocation - in short, financial `repression’ that produces inefficiencies in both
portfolio holdings and in investment allocation.  Internal liberalization stimulates domestic saving and
improves its allocation via financial markets.  External integration permits global market forces to
determine interest rates, bond and equity prices and the foreign exchange rate.
Although global financial flows have increased sharply in the 1990s, both foreign direct
investment and portfolio flows seem to follow development rather than lead it.  Long-term global
financing of investment still remains a small share as revealed by the persistent and high correlation
between national saving and investment rates.  International interest rate differentials also remain
stubbornly high (Avramovic, 1993).  And much of that long-term flow is heavily concentrated in a dozen
or so countries. Yet, the potential returns not merely to physical capital investments but also to human
capital and infrastructure investments in LDCs are undoubtedly high.  It is evident therefore that global
financial markets and flows are deeply fragmented rather than integrated.
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While it might be argued that this anomaly arises from the pursuit of improper macroeconomic
policies and government controls of the financial system, such an assessment ignores, on the one hand,
the underlying structural constraints and market failures and, on the other, the limited scope for liberal
policy choices without imposing potentially costly tradeoffs including exacerbation of fiscal constraints. 
Indeed, fragmentation characterizes even the domestic financial markets in LDCs.  Finance flows but
unevenly among the modern industrial sector where much of the learning process must concentrate, the
informal and agricultural sectors which are the prime sources of employment and livelihoods, and the
public sector which must play the leading role in creating infrastructural and human capital.  Uneven
access to finance and wide differences in interest rates arise essentially from financial market failures
owing to significant externalities and information asymmetries, and from the finance-fisc nexus (see
below).  In other words, intra-national fragmentation of finance is not unlike the global fragmentation
noted above.  Moreover, different parts of indigenous financial markets, even when not closed by
policy, are highly unevenly connected with global markets.
The fiscal constraint and the uneven development of finance interact strongly to limit policy
choices.  The fiscal constraint, particularly the dynamic lag in relation to growth, implies that the public
sector financing requirement runs well ahead of government revenues and borrowing capacities. 
Governments have resorted to forced finance: by monetizing the deficit and forcing saving via inflation or
by requiring domestic banks, through reserve and portfolio requirements, to accommodate government
finance.  Forced saving and financial repression both have their economic and political limits but so does
revenue mobilization.  Prudential regulation apart, a major reason for controls over banking in LDCs
arises from the fiscal constraint.  But note also that such controls cannot be sustained without a captive
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supply which, in turn, is a prime motive for external capital controls.  Thus, financial repression together
with capital controls may be understood as arising, in major part, from financial market fragmentation
and the infeasibility of first-best policies for public financing.
Hence, it is to be expected that attempts at liberalizing and opening up the financial system are
liable to impose fiscal costs.  One source of this cost arises from relaxing financial repression  It has
been estimated that the implicit fiscal gain from repression amounted to 2% of GDP (Giovannini and de
Melo, 1993).  Similarly, reduced monetization of the fiscal deficit that is compelled by financial
liberalization results in the loss of seignorage revenues; as inflation declines, the inflation tax also falls as
governments cannot reduce their debt obligations through a declining real value of money.  Thus, in
LDCs with large fiscal deficits, while the loss in real value of government liabilities held by the private
sector averaged 2.7% of GDP in 1983-89, it fell to 1.7% of GDP in 1990-95.  The corresponding
figures for countries with moderate fiscal deficits were 3.5% and 2.8% respectively (IMF, 1996).
Exchange rate changes matter not only for the external balance but also for the fiscal balance. 
Devaluations raise debt service burdens directly that rest disproportionately on the budget while
benefiting the private export sectors which may not be easily taxed.  It should also be noted that there
are secondary fiscal impacts flowing from losses in trade tax and other sources of revenue noted in the
previous sections.  Revenue losses induce a rise in the domestic and/or foreign debt which may force up
the interest rate and thus the interest burden on the budget.
Table 5 draws attention to contrasting trends across country groups in public debt and the
burden of servicing that debt.  Whereas the debt/GDP ratio has, between the early 1980s and the
1990s, remained essentially stable in the high-income and lower middle-income groups (at about
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50%), it has doubled from about 50% in the low-income group.  Even the upper middle-income
group has stabilized its debt/GDP ratio over the last decade after an initial rise.  The trend in the
public interest burden follows these trends rather closely.  In particular, interest expenditure
relative to GDP in low-income countries has risen sharply from 1.5% to 3.6% in the space of a
decade.  While the  interest burden in low-income countries is not much above that in the lower
middle-income group (and is in fact lower than in the other two groups) when measured relative to
GDP, it represents a much greater and growing fiscal constriction given their much lower tax/GDP
ratio which has also been falling in this period.  Thus, as a share of total current expenditure, the
interest burden has risen from 6.1% in the early 1980s to 15.5% in the 1990s.
The period of adjustment represented in Table 5 has not seen any rise, rather some
decline, in the ratio of gross domestic investment to GDP.  There has been a noticeable trend
toward privatization in investment (witness the rise in the private sector proportion of gross
domestic fixed investment) everywhere, especially in the middle-income groups.  At least in terms
of raising the realized domestic investment ratio, the trend toward privatization and greater reliance
on foreign investment has not helped.
A revealing if crude index capturing the fiscal impact of trade and financial liberalization is
provided by changes in government interest expenditure and trade tax revenues (both relative to
GDP).  First, define a fiscal index by the difference between trade taxes and interest expenditures:
F-INDX = (TradTax/Y)      - (IntExp/Y) (4)
Between-period reductions in this index may be taken to represent the degree of fiscal “squeeze”
related to trade and financial liberalization.  Thus,
F-SQZ = Ä(TradTax/Y)      - Ä(IntExp/Y) (5)
Tables 6 and 6A show the results for a cross-section of LDCs.  As before, the time periods for
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which the fiscal squeeze index and its components are calculated are 1970-79, 1980-87 and 1988-
1996 (periods 1, 2 and 3 respectively).  Based on underlying level variables that are averages for
the respective periods, between-period changes are computed as changes in those averages between
successive periods.  Accordingly, change indicators pertain to periods 2 and 3.
The first three columns of Table 6 summarize the fiscal squeeze variables for the 4 LDC
country groups (low-income SSA, other low-income, lower middle-income and upper middle-
income) while the corresponding columns in Table 6A show individual country results.  A negative
value for the fiscal squeeze variable indicates an adverse fiscal impact.  For virtually all country
groups and both time periods, Table 6 shows both revenue losses on the trade account and
expenditure rises on the interest account.  The rise in interest expenditure was the dominant
contributory factor except for low-income SSA and lower-middle-income countries in period 3
when losses from trade taxation constituted a sizable share of the fiscal squeeze.  The fiscal squeeze
ranged between 1 and 2 per cent of GDP in both periods.  Between the two periods, the index rose
in both the low-income groups, fell in the lower middle-income group and stayed unchanged in the
upper middle-income group.  Table 6A shows that 46 out of 58 countries in period 2 and 45 of 61
countries in period 2 experienced a fiscal squeeze.
While the fiscal squeeze index is only an accounting device, the following regression shows
that it is closely related to both trade liberalization and the financial consequences of opening up
after controlling for changes in the trade/GDP ratio15.
                                                
15  The fiscal squeeze index is entered with a negative sign in the regression.
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- FISSQZ    =   0.46  -   0.07Ä(TradTax/Tr.)  +  0.17Ä(IntExp/CurExp)  -  0.17Ä(Trad/Y) (6)
  (0.23)   (0.02)      (0.03) (0.07)
  (0.05)   (0.00)      (0.00) (0.03)
(with R2=0.26 and N=163).
Trade liberalization is here indexed by changes in the ratio of trade tax revenues to the value of
trade whilst financial policy changes are captured by changes in the ratio of government interest
expenditure to total current expenditure.  Both variables have the expected signs and are
statistically significant.  The regression also shows that countries that improved their trade shares of
GDP reduced the fiscal squeeze.
5.  Infrastructure and Human Development Impacts
The adverse fiscal effects of liberalization and globalization have implications for both economic
development and income distribution.  These flow directly from the fiscal squeeze that can reduce both
infrastructure and human development expenditures on the public account.  There are also important
indirect effects to be considered.  One such effect arises from the greater amplitude of fluctuations in
incomes and relative prices, not to mention financial crises of the sort seen recently in Asia, Russia and
elsewhere, that globalization brings in its train.  These are apt to hurt especially the poor and vulnerable
segments of the population. Another indirect effect flows from income redistributions due to reductions
in real wages, increased informalization, and increased skilled/unskilled wage differentials.  Real income
reductions of the poor may also be induced by increased relative prices of food, cuts in food and other
wage goods subsidies, higher user charges for health and educational services, etc.
Low-income countries with low levels of human development seem particularly to be in danger
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of marginalization due to globalization.  One reason is that these countries are especially hard hit by the
fiscal impact discussed in the preceding sections.  Second, with low levels of human development, they
lack the capabilities to benefit from globalization.  Human development and good infrastructure are key
to both industrialization and raising international competitiveness.  Third, lacking established safety nets,
they are liable to experience the backwash effects of globalization such as de-industrialization, terms of
trade losses, and trade-induced instability.
Raising the level of human development is principally a matter of raising investment, especially
public investment, and of reaching large sections of the population that the market bypasses.  Both
factors originate from pronounced externalities in such areas as health, education, and training, and
market failures in insurance, credit, and infrastructure creation.  On the face of it, the required
investments and provision of opportunity should have nothing to do with a policy of globalization i.e.,
they have to be undertaken as part of any program of economic development quite independently of
policies with respect to external integration.  But this is simply not so.  While low levels of human
development and infrastructure make poor countries more vulnerable to the costs of globalization
without being able to benefit from it, globalization also makes it more difficult for them to raise their
levels of human development and infrastructure.  This suggests a cumulative process that can hold back
development.  Clearly, the government budget is a crucial link in this process.
Tables 6 and 6A provide cross-country evidence on changes in government expenditure on
the capital account and on education as well as changes in gross domestic investment (all relative to
GDP).  As the Tables show, time-series data on government education expenditures are less
abundant than for capital expenditure.  Although ideally health expenditures and other human
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development expenditures should also be considered, adequate cross-country time-series were
unavailable.  The group-wise averages in Table 6 show that government capital expenditure fell in
all the four groups in period 3 which includes the 1990s.  Note also that low-income SSA suffered a
decline in education expenditures in the latest period.
On the other hand, gross domestic investment recovered in low-income SSA after a decade
of decline accompanied by declining per capita incomes but this recovery was marginal at best, a
bit above neutralizing the earlier decline.  The other low-income group experienced rising
investment but investment growth slowed down substantially between the two periods.  By contrast,
middle-income countries witnessed a continuation of falling investment ratios with only a small
drop in the rate of decline.
The declines in government capital expenditure and gross domestic investment are related
to each other but more importantly, these declines took place in a period when the fiscal squeeze
from globalization was also taking effect.  As we argue below, the trend in public educational
expenditures is also related to the fiscal squeeze though this may not be immediately apparent.  The
following regression reveals the link between the fiscal index (defined in equation 4) and public
capital expenditure controlling for income, size and the trade ratio.
PUBINV/Y  =  5.46  -  0.58Ln(pcY)  +  0.06Ln(Pop.)  +   0.04(Trade/Y)  +  0.25(F-INDX) (7)
 (5.07)   (0.32)     (0.24)          (0.01)     (.08)
 (0.28)   (0.07)     (0.81)          (0.00)    (0.00)
(with R2=0.26 and N=196).
This result supports several interesting conclusions.  First, public investment is inversely related
to per capita income levels.  This shows that infrastructure and related capital expenditure requirements
are larger in countries at the beginning stages of modern economic growth and/or that a greater part of
-37-
such capital expenditures tend to be publicly organized and financed in such countries.  Either way, this
indicates the greater importance of the public finance constraint in countries at low levels of
development.  Second, this last conclusion is directly confirmed by the positive and statistically
significant coefficient for the fiscal index.  Countries that were fiscally squeezed by lowered trade tax
revenues and/or increased interest expenditures tended to have a lower rate of public capital
expenditure.  Capital expenditure falls by one quarter of any drop in the fiscal index.  Finally, the
positive coefficient on trade shows that, all else being the same, enlarged trade increases public capital
expenditure.  Since the tax-base effect of trade on public revenues is already captured by F-INDX, this
coefficeint probably reflects a foreign exchange constraint: higher trade volumes indicate a relaxation of
that constraint which serves to push up public investment.
The above specification was repeated using the total of public capital and public education
expenditures as the dependent variable and the following result obtained:
EDU/Y +     =   6.65 - 0.46Ln(pcY) + 0.12Ln(Pop.) + 0.05(Trade/Y)  +  0.37(F-INDX) (8)
PUBINV/Y  (6.94)  (0.43)  (0.32)   (0.01)        (0.10)
 (0.34)  (0.29)  (0.71)   (0.00)        (0.00)
(with R2=0.387 and N=127).
Note that the income coefficient is not statistically significant although it remains negative as in equation
(7). The smaller size of the sample than for equation (7) may be a factor here.  At any rate, equation (8)
reveals a large and significant coefficient for the fiscal constraint as indexed here.  With a $1 decline in
trade-tax revenues or rise in government interest expenditure, public expenditure on capital formation
and human capital falls by $0.37.  This result is consistent with the one obtained in equation (7) for
public capital formation alone.
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As the key determinant of economic growth, it is of considerable interest to see how gross
domestic investment reacts to the fiscal index.  Apart from income per capita and size, the specification
below controls for the trade ratio, public capital expenditure and educational expenditure.
GDI/Y   =  - 61.74 + 2.75Ln(pcY) + 3.24Ln(Pop.) + 0.08(Trade/Y)  +  0.69(F-INDX) (9)
        (9.29)   (0.59) (0.42) (0.02)      (0.14)
        (0.00)   (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)      (0.00)
+  0.67(CapExp/Y)  +  0.72(EducExp/Y)
   (0.14) (0.30)
   (0.00) (0.02)
(with R2=0.49 and N=132).
All variables bear the right sign and are statistically significant.  The investment ratio is an increasing
function of both per capita income and population size.  Following the previous interpretation, the
positive coefficient on the trade ratio indicates a foreign exchange constraint on accumulation.  As for
the fiscal constraint, a $1 loss of revenue from trade or increase in the interest burden leads to a decline
of $0.69 in gross domestic investment.  Again, this result provides further confirmation of the fiscal fetter
on accumulation.  Two further conclusions may be noted.  Educational expenditure has a large and
positive impact on domestic capital formation.  Thus, public investment in education and total investment
in physical capital are strong complements.  Finally, the coefficient on public capital expenditure though
positive is less than unity.  While this seems to indicate a crowding-out of private investment, this result
should be seen together with the large positive coefficient on F-INDX.  Thus, enhanced fiscal capacity
would seem to have a strong direct effect of crowding in private investment as well.
The above results regarding the determinants of public investment expenditure, public
educational expenditure, and domestic capital formation, underline the centrality of the fiscal constraint
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for economic growth and human development.  Together with the results in preceding sections showing
significant adverse fiscal effects from globalization, this refutes the notion that human development need
have nothing to do with a policy of globalization.  Rather, it indicates an important tradeoff between
external integration and internal integration with the government budget providing the fulcrum of that
tradeoff.  Liberalization shifts resources from the public to the private sectors thus exacerbating the
budget constraint.  This not only lowers public investment but, in the end, also serves to lower
economy-wide accumulation.
While externally-oriented liberalization has been promoted mainly with a view to the efficiency
gains it is promised to deliver, its distributional effects may in fact be more important in both political and
economic terms.  One such effect is the redistribution from government to the private economy which
we have just considered.  The other of course pertains to redistributions within the private sector.  Such
redistributions arise from relative price changes and the consequent resource reallocations and factor
price changes.  Attempts at liberalizing domestic economies and integrating with world markets impose
costs on some groups while benefiting others; hence they pose political problems which may show up in
the budget. 
Yet, these demands on the budget that globalization produces pile up on top of reduced
revenues and increased debt obligations.  The paradox of globalization is that it places the strongest
demands on the weakest states after weakening them further.  This is related to two considerations.  On
the one hand, the fiscal losses from globalization are largest for the poor countries.  On the other, it is
the poor countries that have small and fiscally weak states to begin with; the developed economies have
large governments whose capabilities have been built up in the course of development.  As Tanzi (1998)
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has pointed out,  “The reason is not that the [advanced industrial countries] need more government than
the [poor countries] but because they can collect more taxes” (emphasis added).  Yet, it is the poorer
countries that need fiscally stronger states to cope with widespread market failures and complex
distributional changes.
Relative price shifts that accompany globalization may also weaken the fisc.  Liberalizing
agricultural prices, for example, can produce large real transfers from poor consumers (for whom food
is the overwhelming part of private expenditure) to agricultural rentiers and traders16.  When developing
countries as a group face pressures to get their agricultural-exportable prices “right” i.e., alignment with
world price levels, this will also produce a net transfer of resources to the consuming countries via terms
of trade losses.  These effects are additional to the permanent increase in the variability of producer
prices and export earnings that openness entails, and to the transitory costs of de-industrialization and
unemployment that adjustment requires.
                                                
16   Higher agricultural prices will also lower the real wage of labor to the extent that agricultural
(food and raw material) goods figure heavily in labor's consumption bundle even though agriculture is
labor-intensive.  `Peasants’, on the other hand, gain as owners of land but may lose as food consumers
or labor suppliers.
The real income loss of poor food consumers due to liberalized food and agricultural prices will
be reinforced if food or fertilizer subsidies are cut at the same time.  In such cases, the redistribution
does not implicate the fisc directly.  But note that indirect effects on the budget are likely e.g., if
government employees demand and secure compensatory nominal wage increases, government current
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expenditure will rise or, if private non-agricultural employees are similarly compensated, government tax
revenues decline along with non-agricultural profits.  But political compulsion might force the
government also to extend or at least maintain food subsidies.  The rise in food prices, however, entails
a larger fiscal outlay for such subsidies to achieve the same real subsidy level.  The budget rarely goes
unscathed from major price realignments as in the present example.
In standard trade theory, when trade arises from factor endowment differences rather than intra-
industry competition, trade liberalization will reduce the income of the scarce factor while benefiting the
abundant factor of production.  A great deal of trade between rich countries and developing countries is
probably largely complementary in this sense (with specialization predicted by comparative advantage).
 The usual presumption in a two-factor world is that abundant labor will gain at the expense of scarce
capital in LDCs.  There are a number of qualifications however.  First, with large reservoirs of
underemployed or surplus labor, the relative price shifts from trade opening will produce employment
rather than wage increases.  Second, trade opening can be expected to reduce employment and wages
in import-competing sectors, and as firms seek to reduce costs, lower workplace standards and
weaken trade unions, minimum wage enforcement, etc.  Third, with a third factor present in the form of
skilled labor, a rise in unskilled wages is no longer assured.  If skilled and unskilled labor are easily
substituted, then, the skilled-unskilled wage differential may widen and wage-based inequality rise.  This
last effect may be reinforced if technical change favoring substitution of skilled-labor and capital for
unskilled labor accompanies liberalization.  Similarly, with agricultural land as the third factor, a real
wage increase from liberalization is not assured.
For developing countries, evidence on changes in absolute poverty and relative inequality (both
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in terms of the personal distribution of income) are rather more available than evidence on the functional
distribution of income which the foregoing arguments relate.  Of course, the two distributions are closely
related in general.  Accordingly, cross-country evidence over the period 1970-95 has been examined to
see if there are broad associations between trends in openness on the one hand and poverty and
inequality on the other (Rao, 1998).  Openness is measured by the export/GDP ratio and the Trade
Index (which is the trade/GDP ratio after eliminating the effects of per capita income level and
population size). The majority of countries in the sample witnessed a rise in their openness.  There were
a number of countries in which poverty, as measured by the head-count ratio below US $1 per day,
increased though the numerical edge was on the side of those where poverty decreased.  The sample as
a whole shows a positive (and statistically significant) relationship between changes in the Trade Index
measure of openness and changes in poverty with an adjusted R2 of 0.2917.  Countries with declining
poverty had on average an openness trend of 0.1% per annum whilst those with rising poverty had an
average openness trend of 2.1% (the corresponding figures for the export/GDP index of globalization
were 0.7% and 2.0% pa).
                                                
17  There was, however, no statistically significant link between poverty changes and trends in
the export/GDP measure of openness.
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Turning to the link between changes in openness and inequality, few countries in the sample
witnessed a decline in both openness and inequality.  Observations showing a rise in inequality were
rather evenly divided among those with rising openness and falling openness.  Countries opening up
similarly showed roughly equal proclivity to become less unequal as more unequal.  Although there was
a positive relationship between the trend in openness (Trade Index) and the trend in inequality, the
regression coefficient was not statistically significant at any conventional level18.  In terms of sample
means, countries with declining inequality had an openness trend of 0.6% pa while those with rising
inequality opened up at 1.1% pa (the corresponding figures for trends in the export ratio or globalization
are 2.0% and 1.6% pa).
From a policy standpoint, dealing with the poverty, dislocation, volatility and distributive effects
of globalization may be considered in terms of tax and expenditure policies.  Consider the tax policy
potential.  Ideally, taxes must be designed so as to strengthen the fisc and promote human development,
objectives that would seem best served by a progressive structure of taxes.  As already seen, this need
not have a net disincentive effect on domestic investment; on the contrary, such a structure would be
complementary to economic growth.
                                                
18  Similarly, the export measure of globalization explained little of the variation in inequality.
But administrative (and political constraints) related mainly to low levels of development remain
formidable barriers.  Tangible wealth and property which constitute the real base of taxable incomes
have been particularly difficult to tax in poor countries whereas human capital which constitutes the
larger taxable element in rich countries is more easily taxed in the rich countries.  Though much is made
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of the influence of tax rates on tax compliance, lax enforcement allows ample scope for evasion of both
direct and indirect taxes whatever the rates.  Most taxable incomes in the informal sectors simply escape
the tax net, agricultural incomes and wealth are typically exempt from taxes, and corporations and the
well-to-do in the formal sector get away with legal concessions and artful subterfuge.  Official corruption
imposes its own tax on the state’s rightful take.  Similarly, public services though formally offered free
are often subject to informal charges.  A major problem that arises from the heterogeneity of enterprise
structures in developing countries is that of horizontal inequity: the unequal treatment of equals.  Thus,
small entrepreneurs escape taxes which the salaried classes with similar incomes must cough up.  In turn,
of course, this inequity affects the economic structure and enlarges the range and scope of activities
where tax evasion is less costly. Yet, global integration tends to shift the tax structure further in a
regressive direction.  Thus, regressive shifts from corporate and personal income taxes, and trade taxes,
towards consumption-based taxes like VAT are increasingly accepted as inevitable or, result from
competitive concessions.  One of the ironies of globalizing liberalization is that administratively insecure
tax bases are increased at the expense of secure tax bases.
Expenditures on social safety nets take diverse forms across countries but in developing
countries as a rule, free access to health and education, subsidies for items consumed by the poor,
especially food, and crises or temporary measures for those in distress, constitute the chief forms. 
Pensions, health insurance and unemployment benefits, programs characteristic of advanced economies,
are virtually non-existent19.  Table 7 puts together readily available data on public expenditures on
                                                
19  While many relatively high-income east Asian economies have relatively low tax-GDP
ratios (Zee, 1996), this seems due, considering their levels of income, in major part to their lack of
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health and education, and also public capital expenditures.  Data of adequate quality are sparse
both in country and time-period coverage.  It is notable that the GDP share of government capital
expenditure in low-income countries is considerable higher than in rich countries (6.1% in 1991-96
compared to 2.5%).  This gap is higher still when capital expenditure is reckoned relative to
current expenditure (27.1% for low-income countries in the 1990s compared to only 6.7% for high-
income countries).  After falling in the 1980s, education expenditures relative to GDP in low-
income countries have recovered lost ground in the 1990s.  On the other hand, health expenditures
have fallen (from 1.8% of GDP in the late 1980s to 1.6% in the 1990s).  Both health and education
public expenditures have stagnated or fallen in the middle-income groups.
Combating poverty, whether endemic or transitional, with pure cash tax-and-transfer programs
is not administratively practicable and subject to even greater leakage to unintended beneficiaries than
the conventional in-kind transfers.  Yet, there are strong advocates of cost recovery even from the
slender safety nets that in-kind transfers represent in poor countries.  User charges, not to mention
private alternatives, are advocated even in the areas of urban hospitals, clinics, universities, and
transport.  The assumption is that secondary and tertiary education as well as most curative care are
private goods which will find private alternatives if government did not commit to footing the bill.  The
implication is that greater social security can be achieved at lower costs by relying on communities and
households to take up the slack.  The principle that user charges be confined to curative care and for
tertiary education while primary care and education be supplied free seems sensible enough.  But there
                                                                                                                                                            
significant government-mandated safety nets.  In the past, this seemed defensible given labor-
market institutions and norms that limited the unemployment-generating impact of business
fluctuations.  But this is now changing as the norms are tested by the deep financial crises of the
recent past.
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are overwhelming administrative problems in maintaining user charges, policing informal charges, and
confining subsidies to the deserving poor20.
Infrastructure expenditures fulfill a vital allocative function of governments in LDCs primarily
because of the presence of large market failures and externalities.  They are also arguably the most
important or at least most accessible instruments by which the benefits of development can be diffused
across the population.  But unless these expenditures are financed mainly through taxation, the resulting
fiscal deficits are likely to work against equitable outcomes.
                                                
20  Improved targeting of subsidies to maximize budgetary savings ignores ground realities.  For
example, generalized commodity subsidies, it is believed, should be replaced with subsidies or cash
transfers that are narrowly targeted to the “truly needy” (see Chu and Gupta, 1998, p.91).  In many
cases, just the opposite recommendation seems to be called for from the viewpoint of meeting both
administrative constraints and fiscal sustainability.
6.  Conclusion
This paper has been concerned primarily with the fiscal consequences of various measures of
policy liberalization designed to increase the global integration of developing countries.  Its principal
conclusions are that globalization has further accentuated the fiscal constraints facing states, and that
there is a cumulative process of causation between liberal policies and the fiscal constraint.  These
conclusions imply that the fiscal basis of constructive state action to promote human development and
resolve distributive conflict is now more limited than before.
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But globalization is not just an autonomous development, resulting from technological
imperatives; it is also driven by policy choices.  Liberalization has been the principal policy instrument of
globalization in trade and finance.  Thus, not only international financial institutions but also states as
policy-makers, have played an essential determining role in this process of external integration.  Hence,
it appears as something of a paradox that states are seen as helpless in the face of the forces of
globalization.  The paradox dissolves once it is recognized that the global arena of policy has both
powerful and weak players, countries able to take advantage of the global marketplace and those
vulnerable to its compulsions, individual countries and various collectivities of nations, active agents of
change and passive onlookers.  The fiscal autonomy of states has been trimmed, in part, by states acting
autonomously and powerfully.
Even if there are significant long-run benefits to globalization (this remains a controversial claim),
the transition to greater global integration in developing countries requires strong public action and a
stable fiscal base.  The push to globalization can and has been premature from this viewpoint. 
Globalization and human development are not orthogonal to each other.  There are significant tradeoffs
between them mediated especially through the fisc. Developing country governments are especially
constrained by the paucity of tax and expenditure instruments which conflicts with accepted canons of
economic efficiency and `good’ macroeconomic policy which globalizaton is supposed to enforce. 
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TABLE 1:  Trends in Economic Openness
Trade Net FDI Avg Tariff Trade Index Trade Taxes
(% of GDP) (% of GDI) (% of Trade) (%) (% of Trade)
LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES
1970-75 51.4 3.5 .. 42.6 11.1
1976-80 59.7 3.3 .. 47.5 10.6
1981-85 57.5 3.3 .. 46.4 10.2
1986-90 54.8 1.7 .. 46.7 9.9
1991-96 61.3 7.1 26.9 50.2 9.4
LOWER MIDDLE-INCOME COUNTRIES
1970-75 57.4 4.4 .. 43.5 8.6
1976-80 72.3 3.7 .. 49.3 8.3
1981-85 67.3 3.9 .. 48.9 6.6
1986-90 67.8 3.6 .. 48.7 5.8
1991-96 75.8 7.5 17.5 51.2 5.1
UPPER MIDDLE-INCOME COUNTRIES
1970-75 71.2 6.1 .. 46.0 5.7
1976-80 82.8 6.3 .. 49.1 4.7
1981-85 79.7 5.6 .. 50.4 4.8
1986-90 79.4 6.8 .. 49.4 5.2
1991-96 80.2 10.3 11.8 48.0 3.6
HIGH-INCOME COUNTRIES
1970-75 73.2 4.7 .. 44.1 2.7
1976-80 83.6 3.6 .. 46.4 2.0
1981-85 89.9 3.9 .. 49.4 1.6
1986-90 88.1 6.8 .. 48.0 1.3
1991-96 87.7 7.9 6.6 47.5 0.9
ALL COUNTRIES
1970-96 69.3 4.8 17.4 47.5 6.3
TABLE 2:  Trends in Fiscal Aggregates
Nontax Rev Tax Rev Cur Rev Tot Exp Fis Bal For Fin
(% of Gross Domestic Product) (% of GDP) (% of Fis Bal)
LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES
1970-75 2.0 13.6 15.6 18.9 -3.5 56.1
1976-80 2.2 14.1 16.3 22.0 -5.5 47.5
1981-85 2.3 15.3 17.7 24.5 -6.6 45.0
1986-90 2.6 13.9 16.6 24.7 -6.3 42.5
1991-96 2.6 13.1 15.7 22.5 -5.2 53.9
LOWER MIDDLE-INCOME COUNTRIES
1970-75 3.8 14.8 18.7 20.9 -2.4 80.1
1976-80 4.9 16.2 21.2 26.0 -4.4 54.3
1981-85 5.0 17.1 22.1 26.0 -3.9 50.8
1986-90 5.3 16.6 22.0 23.6 -1.3 38.1
1991-96 4.5 17.8 22.3 23.6 -0.7 55.1
UPPER MIDDLE-INCOME COUNTRIES
1970-75 6.7 19.4 26.1 29.5 -4.7 48.0
1976-80 6.7 21.0 27.7 29.5 -2.3 34.4
1981-85 6.7 22.7 29.3 32.6 -4.9 36.5
1986-90 6.3 22.5 28.7 33.7 -5.1 23.3
1991-96 5.4 20.2 25.5 29.7 -3.3 26.4
HIGH-INCOME COUNTRIES
1970-75 2.5 24.0 26.7 27.4 -2.4 22.9
1976-80 3.0 26.5 29.5 32.6 -4.4 27.4
1981-85 3.9 28.4 32.3 36.8 -5.3 24.6
1986-90 3.9 28.4 32.3 36.8 -5.3 24.6
1991-96 3.7 29.8 33.5 37.1 -3.2 40.5
TABLE 3:  The Structure of Taxation
Dir Taxes Soc Secur. Dom Indir. Trade Imports Exports Trade Dom Indir.
(% of Total Tax Revenue) (% of Imports) (% of Exports) (% of Trade) (% of NS VA)
LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES
1970-75 26.1 2.0 29.3 40.8 18.1 6.3 11.1 5.84
1976-80 25.2 2.5 28.3 39.3 17.3 7.5 10.6 7.86
1981-85 25.5 2.4 32.0 37.0 17.7 6.3 10.2 6.78
1986-90 27.0 1.6 33.5 35.1 18.9 5.1 9.9 7.72
1991-96 25.4 1.3 37.8 32.2 18.9 2.4 9.4 8.30
LOWER MIDDLE-INCOME COUNTRIES
1970-75 29.9 4.8 26.7 31.9 15.9 3.9 8.6 4.90
1976-80 30.4 7.6 24.0 30.0 14.0 4.6 8.3 5.15
1981-85 32.8 8.1 25.0 25.5 13.0 2.8 6.6 5.14
1986-90 32.0 8.4 28.6 23.3 13.9 2.1 5.8 5.65
1991-96 32.7 7.1 33.9 20.3 12.7 0.7 5.1 6.88
UPPER MIDDLE-INCOME COUNTRIES
1970-75 36.7 13.7 24.5 20.8 10.0 3.6 5.7 4.05
1976-80 42.4 11.5 24.8 17.0 10.7 3.7 4.7 5.24
1981-85 36.5 14.1 30.3 15.7 11.4 2.8 4.8 7.01
1986-90 29.5 16.8 31.1 18.2 13.3 1.8 5.2 7.88
1991-96 32.4 14.8 33.8 15.9 12.0 0.6 3.6 6.95
HIGH-INCOME COUNTRIES
1970-75 37.7 17.9 30.8 7.5 6.0 0.4 2.7 5.53
1976-80 37.4 21.4 29.7 6.3 4.9 0.3 2.0 7.87
1981-85 37.7 22.1 30.3 4.9 3.9 0.2 1.6 8.48
1986-90 37.9 21.0 31.6 3.8 3.5 0.1 1.3 8.31
1991-96 36.1 24.4 31.4 2.3 2.4 0.0 0.8 8.00
TABLE 4: Decomposition of Changes in Trade Tax Revenues Relative to GDP
Country Group Period Trade- Avg. Tax Revenues- Avg. Tax Trade- "Laffer"
to-GDP Rate to-GDP Rate to-GDP Effect
(%) (%) (Avg. Annual Rate of Change, %)
Low-Income SSA 2 60.4 9.5 0.4 -0.1 0.5 Yes
3 60.1 8.1 -1.6 -1.6 0.0 x
Other Low-Income 2 41.8 14.0 1.6 1.5 0.1 x
3 50.5 10.9 -1.0 -3.4 2.4 x
Lower Middle-Income 2 53.6 6.8 -1.7 -2.4 0.7 x
3 59.8 5.6 -1.5 -2.9 1.4 x
Upper Middle-Income 2 79.8 4.4 -2.3 -3.8 1.5 x
3 87.7 3.4 -4.4 -5.5 1.1 x
 Note:  Average annual rates of change were computed from period means, where 
            Periods 1, 2 and 3 stand for 1970-79, 1980-87 and 1988-1996 respectively.
TABLE 4A: Decomposition of Changes in Trade Tax Revenues Relative to GDP
Country Period Trade- Avg. Tax Revenues- Avg. Tax Trade- "Laffer"
to-GDP Rate to-GDP Rate to-GDP Effect
(%) (%) (Avg. Annual Rate of Change, %)
Low-Income SSA 2 60.4 9.5 0.4 -0.1 0.5
3 60.1 8.1 -1.6 -1.6 0.0
Burkina Faso 2 42.5 9.7 -2.0 -3.4 1.4 x
Burundi 3 32.7 11.6 -1.8 -2.1 0.4 x
Cameroon 2 54.4 8.6 -3.8 -4.6 0.8 x
Cameroon 3 37.0 7.1 -6.8 -2.3 -4.5 x
Chad 3 60.6 3.3 -1.3 0.6 -1.9 Yes
Congo, Dem. Rep. 2 40.8 7.9 -3.3 -7.3 3.9 x
Congo, Dem. Rep. 3 47.1 5.6 -2.4 -4.1 1.7 x
Ethiopia 3 21.2 12.8 -4.4 -1.8 -2.7 x
Gambia, The 3 148.7 6.3 -3.3 -6.1 2.8 x
Ghana 2 20.2 16.9 -4.3 0.1 -4.4 Yes
Ghana 3 44.9 10.6 4.0 -5.4 9.4 Yes
Kenya 2 53.9 8.2 1.5 3.2 -1.7 x
Kenya 3 58.4 5.5 -3.8 -4.8 0.9 x
Lesotho 2 153.6 17.0 6.2 2.3 3.9 x
Lesotho 3 149.4 16.5 -0.7 -0.4 -0.3 x
Malawi 2 53.8 7.6 3.5 5.6 -2.1 x
Malawi 3 57.1 6.0 -2.1 -2.8 0.7 x
Mali 2 51.2 5.7 -1.1 -4.3 3.2 x
Mali 3 50.7 4.6 -2.7 -2.6 -0.1 x
Niger 2 62.9 8.4 3.1 1.6 1.5 x
Nigeria 2 34.1 5.1 -4.5 -3.3 -1.2 x
Rwanda 2 40.8 13.3 -0.9 -3.1 2.3 x
Rwanda 3 23.6 14.2 -5.6 0.8 -6.4 Yes
Senegal 2 79.6 9.2 0.0 -0.9 0.9 Yes
Sierra Leone 2 65.0 5.7 -7.5 -7.6 0.1 x
Sierra Leone 3 47.6 6.8 -1.6 2.1 -3.7 Yes
Sudan 2 34.8 17.0 -1.9 -3.7 1.8 x
Togo 2 101.1 8.7 -1.4 0.3 -1.7 Yes
Zambia 2 74.9 5.1 7.1 8.4 -1.3 x
Zambia 3 73.7 5.5 0.6 0.8 -0.2 x
Zimbabwe 2 55.6 6.8 15.1 14.8 0.3 x
Zimbabwe 3 71.3 7.3 3.8 0.8 2.9 x
Other Low-Income 2 41.8 14.0 1.6 1.5 0.1
3 50.5 10.9 -1.0 -3.4 2.4
India 2 15.3 21.2 4.7 3.3 1.4 x
India 3 20.6 16.7 0.7 -2.8 3.5 Yes
Pakistan 2 34.9 15.2 0.9 -0.3 1.3 Yes
Pakistan 3 36.0 14.2 -0.4 -0.8 0.4 x
TABLE 4A: Decomposition ... (contd.)
Country Period Trade- Avg. Tax Revenues- Avg. Tax Trade- "Laffer"
to-GDP Rate to-GDP Rate to-GDP Effect
(%) (%) (Avg. Annual Rate of Change, %)
Sri Lanka 2 68.9 10.4 -2.0 -3.1 1.1 x
Sri Lanka 3 70.6 6.9 -4.6 -4.9 0.3 x
Nicaragua 2 48.0 9.0 2.9 6.4 -3.5 x
Nicaragua 3 74.8 5.9 0.2 -5.0 5.2 Yes
Lower Middle-Income 2 53.6 6.8 -1.7 -2.4 0.7
3 59.8 5.6 -1.5 -2.9 1.4
Botswana 2 103.7 9.9 -1.1 -3.3 2.1 x
Botswana 3 95.7 8.5 -2.8 -1.8 -0.9 x
Namibia 3 113.5 8.7 0.8 1.4 -0.6 x
Swaziland 3 165.8 7.1 -4.7 -5.9 1.2 x
Fiji 3 115.9 5.6 0.3 -2.5 2.9 Yes
Indonesia 2 48.6 2.2 -7.5 -8.8 1.3 x
Indonesia 3 49.8 1.8 -2.0 -2.2 0.3 x
Papua New Guinea 2 94.3 5.0 4.5 3.7 0.8 x
Papua New Guinea 3 92.2 6.3 2.4 2.7 -0.3 x
Philippines 2 49.6 6.1 -2.6 -3.4 0.8 x
Philippines 3 68.1 6.6 4.7 1.0 3.7 x
Thailand 2 50.8 6.4 -0.9 -2.7 1.8 x
Thailand 3 77.2 4.4 0.5 -4.4 4.9 Yes
Egypt, Arab Rep. 2 57.1 11.9 -4.2 -3.6 -0.6 x
Egypt, Arab Rep. 3 54.9 6.5 -7.6 -7.2 -0.5 x
Jordan 3 132.2 6.1 1.1 -0.7 1.8 Yes
Morocco 2 52.7 8.0 1.5 0.3 1.2 x
Morocco 3 54.9 8.3 0.9 0.4 0.5 x
Tunisia 2 77.1 11.5 3.2 1.2 2.0 x
Tunisia 3 89.0 9.4 -0.7 -2.4 1.7 x
Bolivia 3 42.2 2.7 -6.2 -8.6 2.4 x
Colombia 2 27.8 7.2 -2.1 -1.3 -0.8 x
Colombia 3 33.4 5.5 -0.9 -3.1 2.1 x
Costa Rica 2 71.1 6.6 2.9 2.5 0.5 x
Costa Rica 3 77.5 6.8 1.3 0.3 1.0 x
Dominican Rep. 2 47.9 7.9 -6.6 -6.3 -0.4 x
Dominican Rep. 3 65.9 9.2 5.5 1.8 3.8 x
Ecuador 2 57.7 3.7 -6.1 -4.6 -1.5 x
El Salvador 2 54.0 7.2 -2.9 -0.6 -2.3 x
El Salvador 3 47.9 3.9 -8.5 -7.1 -1.4 x
Guatemala 2 34.5 5.7 -5.2 -1.9 -3.3 x
Guatemala 3 41.9 4.4 -0.6 -2.9 2.3 x
Jamaica 2 97.9 2.0 1.6 -1.1 2.7 Yes
Panama 3 175.9 1.4 -1.0 -3.5 2.4 x
TABLE 4A: Decomposition ... (contd.)
Country Period Trade- Avg. Tax Revenues- Avg. Tax Trade- "Laffer"
to-GDP Rate to-GDP Rate to-GDP Effect
(%) (%) (Avg. Annual Rate of Change, %)
Paraguay 2 39.2 3.9 -7.4 -9.0 1.6 x
Paraguay 3 53.6 3.7 3.2 -0.5 3.7 Yes
Peru 2 35.2 9.0 1.2 1.3 0.0 x
Peru 3 25.5 5.4 -9.9 -6.1 -3.8 x
Venezuela 2 40.7 7.6 8.8 10.4 -1.6 x
Venezuela 3 53.9 3.2 -7.0 -10.3 3.3 x
Poland 3 47.4 6.1 0.4 -2.9 3.3 Yes
Turkey 2 26.8 3.9 -8.8 -17.0 8.2 x
Turkey 3 35.1 2.1 -4.3 -7.5 3.2 x
Upper Middle-Income 2 79.8 4.4 -2.3 -3.8 1.5
3 87.7 3.4 -4.4 -5.5 1.1
Mauritius 2 106.0 10.0 3.7 3.4 0.3 x
Mauritius 3 129.0 7.3 -1.4 -3.7 2.3 x
Seychelles 3 118.9 20.2 3.8 3.8 0.0 x
South Africa 2 54.0 1.6 -3.6 -3.2 -0.4 x
South Africa 3 47.2 2.3 2.6 4.2 -1.6 x
Malaysia 2 109.3 5.7 -0.9 -3.4 2.5 x
Malaysia 3 156.9 2.6 -5.1 -9.4 4.3 x
Oman 3 85.4 1.1 1.6 1.9 -0.3 x
Argentina 3 16.1 7.5 -1.3 -2.0 0.8 x
Barbados 2 124.7 3.6 -3.7 -3.8 0.1 x
Barbados 3 98.7 3.8 -2.0 0.8 -2.8 Yes
Brazil 3 15.3 3.3 -5.4 -2.9 -2.5 x
Chile 2 50.2 4.2 -2.2 -6.0 3.9 x
Chile 3 59.2 3.6 0.1 -1.8 2.0 Yes
Mexico 2 26.6 3.1 -5.1 -9.9 4.8 x
Mexico 3 37.8 2.4 1.1 -3.1 4.1 Yes
Trinidad 2 84.1 3.3 -0.6 -0.2 -0.4 x
Trinidad 3 85.4 2.4 -3.6 -3.8 0.2 x
Uruguay 2 40.9 6.9 3.3 1.4 1.9 x
Uruguay 3 42.6 4.4 -4.8 -5.3 0.5 x
Greece 2 39.6 1.1 -12.4 -14.4 2.0 x
Greece 3 44.0 0.1 -32.7 -33.9 1.2 x
Hungary 3 66.0 4.5 -1.9 0.2 -2.1 Yes
Malta 2 162.9 4.5 -2.0 -1.8 -0.2 x
Malta 3 175.9 4.9 1.8 0.9 0.9 x
 Note:  Average annual rates of change were computed from period means, where 
            Periods 1, 2 and 3 stand for 1970-79, 1980-87 and 1988-1996 respectively.
TABLE 5:  Public Debt, Interest and Investment
Pub Debt Interest Interest Int. Rate on Gr. Dom. Inv Priv. GDFI Net FDI
(% of GDP) (% of GDP) (% of CurExp) Pub Debt (% of GDP) (% of GDFI) (% of GDI)
LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES
1970-75 34.6 1.1 5.1 3.6 17.7 65.4 3.5
1976-80 63.3 2.5 9.8 5.1 19.5 46.4 2.8
1981-85 50.9 1.5 6.1 3.9 20.8 50.4 3.2
1986-90 87.3 2.8 11.6 5.2 19.3 50.5 2.4
1991-96 98.4 3.6 15.5 3.9 20.7 55.0 7.3
LOWER MIDDLE-INCOME COUNTRIES
1970-75 21.4 0.8 3.8 3.7 23.8 64.0 4.4
1976-80 23.9 1.3 5.2 4.3 27.5 59.0 4.1
1981-85 45.2 2.2 8.8 5.1 24.2 56.3 3.9
1986-90 48.6 2.5 11.4 7.2 22.7 63.1 3.7
1991-96 46.3 2.7 12.0 6.6 23.6 66.4 8.3
UPPER MIDDLE-INCOME COUNTRIES
1970-75 24.6 1.2 4.8 4.5 25.7 62.7 6.2
1976-80 28.0 1.5 5.6 5.5 27.2 62.7 6.3
1981-85 35.4 2.9 10.8 12.6 23.3 65.4 5.6
1986-90 45.8 5.2 16.9 10.0 21.4 73.0 6.8
1991-96 45.7 4.3 14.5 7.8 21.1 76.2 10.7
HIGH-INCOME COUNTRIES
1970-75 27.8 1.4 4.7 10.8 26.8 81.6 5.5
1976-80 37.5 2.2 6.5 6.5 26.0 78.1 3.9
1981-85 52.0 4.1 10.4 8.1 23.7 75.2 3.9
1986-90 51.4 4.6 12.2 8.6 23.3 79.3 6.8
1991-96 50.8 4.1 10.6 7.2 22.3 80.7 8.4
TABLE 6: Liberalization, Fiscal Impact and Accumulation in Developing Countries
Country Group Period Trade- Interest Fiscal Gov. Educ. Gov. Cap. Gr. Dom. PC Income
Tax Rev. Expend. Squeeze Expend. Expend. Invest. Avg. Ann.
(Change between periods, % of GDP) Growth (%)
Low-Income SSA 2 0.4 1.4 -1.1 . 0.9 -1.4 -0.6
3 -0.7 0.9 -1.6 -0.1 -1.1 1.7 2.7
Other Low-Income 2 0.3 1.4 -1.2 . 3.1 4.3 0.5
3 -0.6 1.2 -1.7 0.0 -2.8 0.7 3.1
Lower Middle-Income 2 -0.4 1.5 -1.9 . -1.2 -1.0 1.6
3 -0.4 0.6 -1.0 0.2 -1.2 -0.8 5.6
Upper Middle-Income 2 -0.1 1.6 -1.7 . -0.7 -1.8 3.9
3 0.1 1.8 -1.7 0.2 -1.5 -1.5 3.9
 Note:  Change between periods was computed from period means, where 
            Periods 1, 2 and 3 stand for 1970-79, 1980-87 and 1988-1996 respectively.
TABLE 6A: Liberalization, Fiscal Impact and Accumulation in Developing Countries
Country Period Trade- Interest Fiscal Gov. Educ. Gov. Cap. Gr. Dom. PC Income
Tax Rev. Expend. Squeeze Expend. Expend. Invest. Avg. Ann.
(Change between periods, % of GDP) Growth (%)
Low-Income SSA 2 0.4 1.4 -1.1 . 0.9 -1.4 -0.6
3 -0.7 0.9 -1.6 -0.1 -1.1 1.7 2.7
Burkina Faso 2 -0.8 0.2 -1.0 . 0.0 -1.9 -0.9
Burundi 3 -0.6 1.0 -1.7 1.1 -0.1 -3.9 1.2
Cameroon 2 -1.9 0.0 -1.9 . 2.7 3.6 -0.3
Cameroon 3 -2.1 1.6 -3.7 0.1 -4.4 -8.5 4.1
Chad 3 -0.2 0.1 -0.3 . -1.9 6.4 4.7
Congo, Dem. Rep. 2 -1.1 0.6 -1.8 . -0.3 -5.3 -1.6
Congo, Dem. Rep. 3 -0.6 -0.3 -0.2 . -1.1 -2.9 -0.6
Ethiopia 3 -1.2 0.4 -1.6 . -0.5 2.0 0.5
Gambia, The 2 1.5 0.8 0.8 . 3.8 7.6 .
Gambia, The 3 -3.1 3.0 -6.1 0.2 -5.0 -1.0 12.4
Ghana 2 -1.6 -0.2 -1.4 . -2.4 -3.1 -0.2
Ghana 3 1.4 0.3 1.1 0.2 1.3 8.0 4.9
Kenya 2 0.6 2.1 -1.6 . -0.4 0.4 0.4
Kenya 3 -1.2 2.9 -4.1 -0.6 0.1 -2.4 2.9
Lesotho 2 11.2 3.6 7.5 . 19.0 22.0 0.3
Lesotho 3 -1.6 1.1 -2.6 -0.1 -7.4 34.6 0.7
Liberia 2 -0.2 2.9 -3.1 . -2.3 -11.5 .
Liberia 3 0.4 -0.5 0.9 . -3.2 . 0.3
Malawi 2 1.1 3.4 -2.3 . 1.6 -9.0 -0.6
Malawi 3 -0.7 -0.4 -0.3 0.0 -2.3 -0.9 3.8
Mali 2 -0.3 0.5 -0.8 . -0.1 0.4 -0.7
Mali 3 -0.6 0.3 -0.9 -1.6 -0.4 6.6 2.4
Niger 2 1.3 0.2 1.1 . 3.5 0.7 -1.0
Nigeria 2 -0.9 5.5 -6.4 . 0.3 -6.8 -0.8
Rwanda 2 -0.4 0.1 -0.5 . 1.4 4.0 -0.7
Rwanda 3 -2.1 1.1 -3.2 0.8 1.5 -3.5 -1.9
Senegal 2 0.0 1.5 -1.5 . 2.0 -5.3 -0.7
Sierra Leone 2 -3.6 0.3 -3.8 . -0.1 -2.0 -1.3
Sierra Leone 3 -0.5 1.6 -2.1 -1.7 -0.6 -4.1 1.8
Sudan 2 -1.1 0.1 -1.2 . -1.1 -0.6 -0.9
Togo 2 -1.2 3.4 -4.6 . -11.7 -7.8 -0.5
Zambia 2 1.8 0.3 1.5 . 0.2 -12.8 -0.4
Zambia 3 0.2 0.0 0.2 -1.4 4.8 -4.1 2.3
Zimbabwe 2 2.8 2.1 0.8 . 0.4 1.0 0.2
Zimbabwe 3 1.4 1.9 -0.5 1.5 1.3 -0.8 3.8
TABLE 6A: Liberalization ... (contd.)
Country Period Trade- Interest Fiscal Gov. Educ. Gov. Cap. Gr. Dom. PC Income
Tax Rev. Expend. Squeeze Expend. Expend. Invest. Avg. Ann.
(Change between periods, % of GDP) Growth (%)
Other Low-Income 2 0.3 1.4 -1.2 . 3.1 4.3 0.5
3 -0.6 1.2 -1.7 0.0 -2.8 0.7 3.1
India 2 1.1 1.0 0.2 . 0.5 2.7 0.0
India 3 0.2 1.7 -1.5 0.7 -0.1 1.9 4.1
Pakistan 2 0.4 1.0 -0.6 . -0.6 2.7 0.3
Pakistan 3 -0.2 2.6 -2.8 0.4 1.0 0.4 3.9
Sri Lanka 2 -1.4 2.0 -3.4 . 6.2 9.5 2.5
Sri Lanka 3 -2.3 1.3 -3.6 0.4 -6.9 -2.9 3.7
Nicaragua 2 1.0 1.8 -0.8 . 6.3 2.1 -0.8
Nicaragua 3 0.1 -0.9 1.0 -1.7 -5.2 3.2 0.7
Lower Middle-Income 2 -0.4 1.5 -1.9 -0.3 -1.2 -1.0 1.6
3 -0.4 0.6 -1.0 0.2 -1.2 -0.8 5.6
Botswana 2 -1.1 0.2 -1.3 -0.4 -2.3 -10.7 2.3
Botswana 3 -2.1 -0.2 -2.0 2.0 -1.5 -1.5 6.4
Namibia 3 0.7 -1.7 2.4 7.0 -1.9 3.0 4.3
Swaziland 2 2.0 0.9 1.2 . -1.0 1.3 .
Swaziland 3 -5.7 0.0 -5.8 0.0 -4.0 -6.1 0.7
Fiji 2 -0.5 1.4 -1.9 . -0.9 0.1 .
Fiji 3 0.2 0.5 -0.3 -0.9 -0.7 -8.6 2.8
Indonesia 2 -1.0 1.0 -2.0 . 2.6 4.8 1.3
Indonesia 3 -0.2 0.4 -0.6 -0.2 -2.4 3.3 7.2
Papua New Guinea 2 1.6 1.2 0.3 . -1.9 0.0 -0.4
Papua New Guinea 3 1.1 0.2 0.9 . -0.2 -1.8 5.8
Philippines 2 -0.8 1.6 -2.4 . 0.5 -3.9 1.0
Philippines 3 1.5 3.0 -1.5 1.1 0.3 -0.8 4.0
Thailand 2 -0.3 1.2 -1.5 . 0.1 2.5 3.5
Thailand 3 0.2 -1.1 1.3 0.2 0.0 11.2 9.6
Egypt, Arab Rep. 2 -3.1 1.1 -4.2 . -2.6 4.4 0.4
Egypt, Arab Rep. 3 -3.3 2.4 -5.7 -0.8 -0.6 -5.1 7.0
Jordan 2 -1.5 1.1 -2.6 . -4.8 -4.7 0.8
Jordan 3 0.7 2.5 -1.8 -1.8 -3.4 0.4 8.3
Morocco 2 0.5 2.6 -2.1 . -1.9 2.2 0.8
Morocco 3 0.3 1.3 -0.9 -0.4 -1.4 -2.7 2.6
Tunisia 2 2.2 1.2 1.0 . 1.9 4.2 1.8
Tunisia 3 -0.5 1.1 -1.7 0.5 -3.5 -5.0 7.2
Bolivia 3 -0.8 0.6 -1.4 0.4 3.0 2.9 6.1
Colombia 2 -0.4 0.3 -0.7 . -1.2 0.7 3.5
Colombia 3 -0.2 0.5 -0.7 0.8 -0.5 0.3 7.4
TABLE 6A: Liberalization ... (contd.)
Country Period Trade- Interest Fiscal Gov. Educ. Gov. Cap. Gr. Dom. PC Income
Tax Rev. Expend. Squeeze Expend. Expend. Invest. Avg. Ann.
(Change between periods, % of GDP) Growth (%)
Costa Rica 2 1.1 0.6 0.4 . -0.7 2.1 4.6
Costa Rica 3 0.5 1.6 -1.0 -1.3 -0.8 0.5 6.9
Dominican Republic 2 -3.1 0.4 -3.5 . -2.7 0.2 1.2
Dominican Republic 3 2.3 0.1 2.2 -0.3 3.1 2.1 6.5
Ecuador 3 -0.8 2.1 -2.9 -1.8 -0.8 -1.5 7.1
El Salvador 2 -1.2 1.1 -2.3 . -0.1 -6.7 0.8
El Salvador 3 -2.0 0.1 -2.1 -1.7 -0.5 4.1 3.8
Guatemala 2 -1.2 0.3 -1.5 -0.1 0.2 -3.8 0.2
Guatemala 3 -0.1 0.3 -0.4 -0.3 -1.3 1.7 4.0
Jamaica 2 0.3 8.6 -8.3 . -2.7 -2.8 2.2
Panama 2 -0.5 2.9 -3.5 . -3.5 . 1.5
Panama 3 -0.2 -3.8 3.6 0.5 -1.9 -0.4 11.0
Paraguay 2 -1.4 0.2 -1.6 . -0.6 4.3 0.9
Paraguay 3 0.5 0.4 0.0 0.9 -0.1 -3.4 3.6
Peru 2 0.3 1.8 -1.5 . -0.1 5.2 0.2
Peru 3 -1.8 -0.3 -1.5 . -1.1 -4.6 6.5
Suriname 2 -1.0 2.2 -3.2 . -4.8 -10.1 .
Venezuela 2 1.7 1.7 0.0 . -1.2 -12.9 2.0
Venezuela 3 -1.4 1.4 -2.8 -0.3 -1.8 -4.0 5.2
Poland 3 0.1 3.1 -3.0 0.6 -1.2 -3.8 4.7
Romania 3 0.8 0.0 0.7 0.5 -6.9 -6.7 2.9
Turkey 2 -1.3 1.1 -2.3 . -0.4 2.2 3.1
Turkey 3 -0.3 1.6 -1.9 0.1 -2.1 5.9 3.4
Upper Middle-Income 2 -0.1 1.6 -1.7 0.7 -0.7 -1.8 3.9
3 0.1 1.8 -1.7 0.2 -1.5 -1.5 3.9
Mauritius 2 3.0 3.4 -0.4 . -1.1 -2.1 5.7
Mauritius 3 -1.1 -2.1 0.9 -0.7 0.3 7.7 5.0
Seychelles 3 6.6 3.7 2.9 -0.3 -3.0 -2.2 6.8
South Africa 2 -0.3 1.4 -1.8 . -0.2 -2.6 1.6
South Africa 3 0.2 2.0 -1.8 1.0 -0.4 -7.5 1.1
Malaysia 2 -0.5 2.9 -3.4 . 3.1 5.9 3.9
Malaysia 3 -2.2 -0.4 -1.8 -0.9 -2.4 3.6 4.8
Oman 2 0.2 0.1 0.1 . -6.1 -2.7 .
Oman 3 0.1 1.1 -0.9 0.8 -4.2 -9.5 5.1
Argentina 2 1.3 1.7 -0.3 . 1.4 -5.4 2.3
Argentina 3 -0.1 -0.6 0.5 0.7 -0.6 -3.5 7.3
Barbados 2 -1.7 1.0 -2.7 . -0.5 -3.5 6.6
Barbados 3 -0.7 0.6 -1.3 1.1 -0.1 -4.3 -1.9
TABLE 6A: Liberalization ... (contd.)
Country Period Trade- Interest Fiscal Gov. Educ. Gov. Cap. Gr. Dom. PC Income
Tax Rev. Expend. Squeeze Expend. Expend. Invest. Avg. Ann.
(Change between periods, % of GDP) Growth (%)
Brazil 3 -0.3 11.5 -11.8 -0.5 -0.6 1.1 5.7
Chile 2 -0.5 -0.3 -0.1 . -3.4 -0.7 5.7
Chile 3 0.0 0.2 -0.2 -1.5 0.2 9.2 5.5
Mexico 2 -0.5 7.2 -7.6 . 0.6 0.7 2.1
Mexico 3 0.1 -2.4 2.5 0.8 -1.9 0.1 6.1
Trinidad and Tobago 2 -0.2 0.1 -0.3 . -0.7 -2.8 3.9
Trinidad and Tobago 3 -0.7 4.5 -5.3 -1.1 -9.4 -10.1 1.7
Uruguay 2 0.7 0.9 -0.2 . -0.3 -4.9 3.4
Uruguay 3 -0.9 0.4 -1.4 0.4 0.2 -2.8 2.4
Greece 2 -0.9 2.0 -2.9 0.7 -0.5 -5.7 4.7
Greece 3 -0.4 6.6 -7.0 0.2 -0.5 -2.4 5.9
Hungary 3 -0.5 1.5 -2.0 1.4 -2.5 -4.5 -4.6
Malta 2 -1.4 -0.8 -0.6 . -0.7 1.7 3.0
Malta 3 1.2 0.6 0.6 1.2 1.9 2.1 7.8
 Note:  Change between periods was computed from period means, where 
            Periods 1, 2 and 3 stand for 1970-79, 1980-87 and 1988-1996 respectively.
TABLE 7:  Trends in Social Investment
Public Expenditure on
Education Health Capital Educ + Health Educ, Health & Cap
(% of Gross Domestic Product) (relative to Interest Expenditure)
LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES
1970-75 .. .. 4.3
.. .. (21.8)
1976-80 3.7 .. 5.8
(16.2) .. (25.6)
1981-85 3.4 .. 5.9
(15.4) .. (23.1)
1986-90 3.5 1.8 6.5 2.0 4.2
(16.5) (7.1) (26.7)
1991-96 3.9 1.6 6.1 1.8 3.4
(17.0) (7.2) (24.9)
LOWER MIDDLE-INCOME COUNTRIES
1970-75 .. .. 5.8
.. .. (27.1)
1976-80 4.2 .. 7.7
(17.2) .. (29.5)
1981-85 4.1 .. 5.9
(16.1) .. (23.0)
1986-90 4.0 2.4 4.7 4.2 6.3
(17.1) (11.7) (19.3)
1991-96 4.1 2.7 4.4 4.1 7.3
(16.5) (9.9) (20.2)
UPPER MIDDLE-INCOME COUNTRIES
1970-75 .. .. 5.8
.. .. (18.8)
1976-80 3.9 .. 5.9
(14.5) .. (19.9)
1981-85 4.4 .. 5.6
(12.9) .. (16.3)
1986-90 4.5 3.5 4.4 2.8 3.6
(13.6) (13.8) (12.9)
1991-96 4.4 3.3 4.0 3.3 4.3
(16.9) (12.4) (13.4)
HIGH-INCOME COUNTRIES
1970-75 .. .. 2.9 .. ..
.. .. (11.6)
1976-80 5.6 .. 3.0 .. ..
(18.2) .. (9.9)
1981-85 5.3 .. 3.0 .. ..
(15.8) .. (8.8)
1986-90 5.2 5.2 2.9 3.5 4.4
(15.8) (15.8) (8.5)
1991-96 5.5 5.8 2.5 6.7 9.1
(15.7) (16.7) (7.4)
Notes Figures in parentheses are relative to public current expenditure.
Bold-faced figures indicate less than 30 observations.
